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ABSTRACT 
This is dissertation consists of three studies investigating accountability in auditing. It is 
aimed at gaining a better understanding of how auditors make decision in the presence of 
accountability pressure. 
 The first study is a literature review of the experimental audit research on accountability. 
It provides a conceptual framework for organizing prior research on this topic and offers 
opportunities for future research. Several areas are in need of continued research. Limited 
research has considered how auditors respond to multiple accountability pressures. However, 
research on multiple accountability pressures is particularly important given the somewhat 
unique environment in which auditors work. They face accountability pressures from a number 
of sources- clients, regulators, shareholders, supervisors, etc. Additional research looking at the 
impact of process and outcome accountability is also needed. Very little research has considered 
how auditors are influenced by these two different types of accountability pressure. However, 
theory would suggest they may have a dramatically different influence on auditors’ decision 
making processes. 
 The second study experimentally investigates accountability as a potential mitigating 
mechanism for the performance declines caused by ego depletion. Auditors are shown to be 
susceptible to depletion, but research has yet to consider how a natural element of the audit 
environment, accountability, influences the relationship between depletion and performance. 
Surprisingly, the results of this study suggest that depletion doesn’t necessarily hinder 
performance, but can actually improve performance in certain circumstances. Furthermore, those 
individuals who were accountable did not perform significantly different based on whether they 
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were depleted or not. The findings suggest both accountability and depletion improve auditor 
performance. However, when both elements are combined, they do not significantly improve 
performance beyond the performance improvements seen when either accountability or depletion 
are present. 
 Study three examines how auditors respond to multiple accountability pressures. It 
considers how a power level difference between two conflicting parties, as well as a variation in 
justification timing, impact auditors’ decisions. The findings suggest that auditors align their 
decisions with the preferences of the more powerful party when there is a large power 
differential between conflicting parties. However, when the power differential is small, auditors 
employ a more integratively complex decision making process allowing them to reach a 
conclusion that they can defend. Justification timing is also shown to influence auditors’ 
decisions, but not in the manner expected. Surprisingly, the results indicate that auditors tend to 
more closely align their decisions with the preferences of the last person to whom they must 
justify their decisions, as to opposed to the first person.  
 Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of accountability in three 
distinct ways. It synthesizes prior research to provide insight into what we have learned thus far 
and where we should go from here in terms of research. It then considers whether accountability 
mitigates the negative effects of ego depletion, where it finds that depletion actually improves, 
rather than hinders, performance. Thus, suggesting auditors aren’t always negatively impacted by 
depletion. Lastly, it provides insight into how auditors make decisions in the presence of multiple 
accountability pressures. A very important, yet dramatically under-researched area in auditing.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three studies investigating accountability in auditing. These three 
studies focus on extending our understanding of the influence that accountability has on auditor 
judgment and decision making.  
Accountability represents the expectation that one will be called upon to justify their 
decisions to some evaluative audience (i.e., accountability source). In the auditing environment, 
accountability mechanisms are formally implemented through the audit review process, the peer 
review process, and the PCAOB review process. However, auditors also face accountability 
pressure from other parties, including clients, banks, and investors (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 
1994).  As Lerner and Tetlock (1999, p. 270) note, “People do not think and act in a social 
vacuum.” As such, it is important to consider how the features of one’s environment influences 
the way in which they make decisions. 
Examining accountability in an audit setting is important for two reasons. First, auditing 
standards require auditors to remain skeptical throughout the audit process and be objective in 
evidence evaluation (PCAOB 2015). Auditors frequently face situations where significant 
judgment is required and decisions have no clear right or wrong answer. Objectivity is 
particularly important in these instances. To the extent that accountability pressures influence 
auditors’ judgment and decision making processes, precautions should be taken to limit these 
influences. A thorough understanding of the effects that these accountability pressures have 
allows firms to restructure their formal accountability mechanisms in ways that maximize auditor 
objectivity, or to implement additional procedures to mitigate these effects.  
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Second, the auditing environment is somewhat unique, in that auditors face multiple 
accountability pressures that must be managed simultaneously (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994). 
Furthermore, the individuals to whom auditors are accountable may have differing preferences 
regarding the decision that the auditors are required to make.  Many organizational employees 
experience accountability pressure, often through a formal review process; however, few face the 
multiple accountability pressures that auditors do.  
This dissertation organizes and synthesizes prior research on accountability in auditing to 
help further research in this area. It also experimentally investigates accountability’s influence on 
auditors’ judgments and decisions. Study one provides a framework for organizing and 
synthesizing approximately 25 years of experimental audit research on accountability. It provides 
a discussion of the literature based on this framework and offers suggestions for future research. 
Study two evaluates the ability of accountability pressure to offset performance declines 
associated with ego depletion, and the third study investigates auditor decision making under 
multiple accountability pressures. The following three sections describes each study in more 
detail, while the final section provides the overall contribution of this dissertation. 
Study One: A Literature Review of Experimental Audit Research on Accountability   
Study one provides a review and synthesis of experimental audit research on 
accountability. The discussion of prior literature is based on an organizing framework that was 
developed by identifying key factors that emerged upon review of the literature. This study 
provides a holistic look at the literature on accountability and offers opportunities for future 
research. The results indicate research focused on auditors’ responses to multiple accountability 
is limited. This is a particularly important area of research given the accountability pressures 
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present in the audit work environment. Additional research examining the influence of 
accountability type on decision making is also needed. Overall, the research generally finds 
results consistent with the Tetlock’s social contingency model of accountability (Tetlock 1992; 
Tetlock and Lerner 1999). However, there are instances in which findings appear to diverge from 
theory; this can be contributed to unique elements of the audit environment. Future research 
should continue to not only consider how auditors respond to accountability pressure, but 
investigate environmental elements the affect auditors’ perceptions or feelings of accountability. 
Study Two: Ego Depletion and Auditor Performance: The Moderating Effect of Accountability 
Prior research suggests that auditors are susceptible to the detrimental effects of ego 
depletion. Ego depletion represents an exhaustion of mental resources that allows individuals to 
exercise self-control. This study draws on accountability theory (Tetlock 1992) and the strength 
model of ego depletion (Baumeister et al. 1998) to investigate whether accountability, an 
inherent element in the auditing environment, can mitigate the impact that ego depletion has on 
performance.  Surprisingly, the results suggest that depletion does not necessarily hinder 
performance, but can improve performance in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the 
performance of individuals who are accountable does not differ significantly based on whether 
they are depleted or not. This suggests that accountability improves the performance of 
individuals who are not depleted, but the performance levels of those who are depleted does not 
significantly differ based on the presence of accountability.   
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Study Three: Auditor Judgment in a Multiple Accounting Setting: The Effects of Power Level 
and Justification Timing 
The third study investigates how auditors operate in a multiple accountability setting. 
Specifically, this study experimentally investigates how a power differential between conflicting 
parties (i.e. audit supervisor and client contact) and a difference in justification timing impact 
auditor decision-making.  Drawing on accountability theory (Tetlock 1999) and construal level 
theory (Liberman and Trope 1998), auditors’ decisions are expected to differ based on whether 
the accountability sources are of relatively equal power, or there is a significant difference in 
power level between the two parties. Furthermore, the timing of the justification (i.e., whether 
the auditors’ must immediately justify their decisions to an accountability source or justify their 
decisions at some point in the future) is expected to influence auditors’ decisions. Consistent 
with expectations, the results of this study indicate that auditors’ decisions vary depending upon 
whether a power difference exists between accountability sources. Auditors more closely align 
their decisions with the preferences of the more powerful party when there is a difference in 
power level between the two sources. Unexpectedly, however, auditors align their decisions with 
the preferences of the party to whom they must justify their decisions at some point in the future, 
as opposed to aligning their decisions with the preferences of the party to whom they must 
immediately justify their decisions. This finding is inconsistent with expectations based on 
construal level theory. Overall, this study adds to our understanding of the influence that a power 
differential has on auditor decision making. Additional research is needed to further investigate 
the effect that justification timing has on auditor decision making.  
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Overall Contribution 
Overall, this dissertation makes several contributions.  It contributes to research in three 
distinct ways. The synthesis of prior audit research on accountability provides insight into what 
has been learned and highlights opportunities for future research. This contributes to research 
beyond the findings of a single study. It provides a holistic view of the literature with a goal of 
motivating others to conduct research on accountability, thereby extending the entire stream of 
research. Studies two and three experimentally investigate auditors’ responses to accountability 
pressure. Study two evaluates whether accountability pressure can overcome the performance 
declines attributable to ego depletion.  This study specifically extends research that investigates 
whether accountability moderates the effect of various factors found to influence auditor 
performance. Study three provides insight into how auditors make decisions given multiple 
accountability pressures. Research on multiple accountability pressures is limited. This study 
contributes to the literature in this area by investigating how auditors’ judgment and decision 
making processes are affected by multiple accountability pressures. The results suggest both a 
power differential between accountability sources and a variation in justification timing 
influence auditor decision making. 
The findings from this dissertation add to our understanding of accountability and, in 
conjunction with prior literature, provide useful information for firms and regulators. Knowledge 
of specific factors associated with accountability relationships that result in decreased auditor 
effort and biased decision making will allow firms to manage these effects. Overall, this 
information will help them to better understand the impact of accountability in order to structure 
or implement accountability mechanisms in ways that maximize auditor objectivity, thus 
improving overall audit quality.   
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STUDY ONE: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL AUDIT 
LITERATURE ON ACCOUNTABILITY 
I. Introduction 
Accountability pressure is an inherent element of the audit environment. This pressure 
represents the requirement of auditors to justify their decisions to individuals in positions to 
evaluate their work (Tetlock 1992). They must manage multiple accountability pressures 
simultaneously on a day to day basis, as auditors are constantly making decisions that must be 
justified to a variety of parties, including superiors, clients, regulators, and financial statement 
users (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994). Research on accountability shows accountability pressure 
affects auditors’ judgment and decision making processes by influencing auditors’ level of 
cognitive effort and extent of work (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; DeZoort et al. 2006; Tan et al. 1997), 
as well as their decision outcomes (e.g. Buchman et al. 1996; Lord 1992), decision 
characteristics (e.g. Ashton 1992; Johnson and Kaplan 1991), and performance (e.g. Asare et al. 
2000; Tan and Kao 1999), and ultimately the outcome of the audit process.   
This paper is designed to provide an overview of the experimental auditing research on 
accountability. A review and synthesis of approximately 25 years of research in the area will 
provide a holistic overview of what has been learned about accountability in auditing.  It will 
also provide insight as to where further research is necessary to help expand our understanding 
of the topic.  This study presents a framework for organizing prior experimental research on 
accountability in auditing. The framework is a mechanism for discussing and synthesizing the 
research in this area. 
The importance of investigating the effects of accountability on auditor decision making 
is two-fold. First, the extent of accountability pressure in the auditing environment is somewhat 
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unique. Auditors simultaneously manage accountability pressure from multiple sources. While 
many organizational employees are accountable to their supervisors through a formal review 
process, employee decisions generally are not subject to evaluation by regulators, clients, and the 
investing public. Auditors’ decisions, however, are subject to evaluation by these parties. 
Furthermore, the multiple parties often have differing preferences regarding the decisions 
auditors must make. Due to the pervasiveness of accountability in auditing, it is extremely 
important to understand how these pressures effect auditor decision making. 
Second, the auditing standards require auditors to exercise professional skepticism, which 
includes an objective evaluation of audit evidence (PCAOB 2015). As such, it is important to 
understand the manner and extent to which auditors’ decisions are influenced by accountability 
pressure. If accountability pressure inadvertently biases auditors’ decision making processes, 
knowledge of such effects allow firms and regulators to implement mitigating mechanisms. 
Conversely, if accountability pressure improves auditor decision making in certain 
circumstances, firms can structure accountability mechanisms in a way that optimizes auditor 
objectivity. 
This paper is structured as follows:  Accountability theory from social psychology is 
discussed briefly to provide a general understanding of how it is applied in the auditing literature.  
Second, a discussion of the manuscript selection process and a framework for organizing the 
research is provided. The third section provides a discussion of the accountability literature 
organized based on the provided framework. Last, an overall conclusion is presented with 
opportunities for future research. 
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II. Underlying Theoretical Motivation for Accountability Research in Auditing  
Given that accounting is a domain of applied research, the auditing literature on 
accountability often draws on theoretical models from social psychology. These theories inform 
expectations regarding auditor behavior in a profession where accountability is a central element 
of the work environment. Prior research recognizes work by Tetlock and colleagues as being the 
most influential in the accountability literature (Hall et al. 2015).  Tetlock’s social contingency 
model is also widely used in the experimental auditing literature on accountability. 
Tetlock’s social contingency model conceptualizes accountability based on the notion of 
individuals as politicians. Accountability is commonly defined in accounting research as “…the 
implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings or 
actions to others.” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255).  Individuals select the course of action most 
likely to please important, evaluative others. The model predicts response strategies to 
accountability pressure (e.g. acceptability heuristic, preemptive self-criticism,) given various 
situational factors (e.g. views1 are known or unknown, process accountability vs. outcome 
accountability) (Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Tetlock 1992). Tetlock argues that decisions are not 
made in a “social vacuum”, and researchers must consider the social context when evaluating 
individual cognitive processes (Tetlock 1992, 335). He contends that accountability can affect 
how individuals think, not just what they say they think and suggests external factors alter 
individual cognitive processing (Tetlock and Lerner 1999).  
Barry Schlenker offers an alternative model of accountability called the pyramid model 
of accountability (Schlenker 1990), which is also referenced in the accounting literature but is 
                                                 
1 The term “preferences” is also used to indicates the views of an accountability source. 
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not as widely cited as Tetlock’s work. The pyramid model is not incompatible with Tetlock’s 
social contingency model, but rather it provides a different conceptualization of accountability. 
The pyramid model considers the way in which certain elements of the accountability setting 
influence an individual’s response. This differs from Tetlock’s model which focuses on the way 
in which individuals cope and respond to accountability pressure. Schlenker’s model considers 
how the environment influences an individual’s response, while Tetlock’s model focuses on how 
individuals respond to their environment (Hall et al. 2015). 
 Accounting research generally supports Tetlock’s social contingency model. Studies 
show that accountability improves auditor effort and auditor performance in situations where the 
preferences of an accountability source are unknown. When the preferences of an accountability 
source are known (or can be inferred), research shows that effort is diminished and auditors 
simply align their decision with the preferences of the source to whom they are accountable. 
However, findings appear to deviate from the social contingency model in one situation. Known 
preferences do not always have detrimental effects on auditor effort and auditor decision 
outcomes. When known preferences are associated with effectively executing the audit process, 
auditor effort increases, highlighting an instance when accountability to a party with known 
views is beneficial. This difference is likely due to the auditing context to which the theory is 
applied. The social contingency model does not differentiate between preference types and 
propose different outcomes based on the nature of an accountability source’s preferences. In 
social psychology, these preferences generally relate to preferred decision outcome. However, 
the nature of auditing is such that known views can relate to preferences for a certain decision 
outcome, or preferences related to the execution of the audit. Understandably, the theory is not 
specific enough to capture every environmental characteristic which may cause a departure from 
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theoretical expectation. This further highlights the importance of studying accountability in an 
audit setting.  
III. Organizing Framework for Accountability Research in Auditing 
 This literature review is focused on examining experimental audit research related to 
accountability. Relevant research was initially identified through a Google Scholar search and 
the American Accounting Association website search mechanism. Four key search terms were 
utilized to identify applicable manuscripts with no constraints related to journal or time-period.2  
The first 150 manuscripts in Google Scholar were reviewed for inclusion in this literature 
review, as well as all 23 manuscripts identified on American Accounting Association website.  
Studies set in an audit context with a clear focus on accountability were included.3 Additional 
studies identified during the vetting process that appeared relevant to this literature review were 
also included. This body of research was then used to establish an organizing framework for 
accountability research in auditing. Figure 1 presents the resulting model.  
                                                 
2 The terms utilized were “auditing”, “accountability”, “experiment”, and “Tetlock”. These search terms were 
selected in order to provide the most results relevant to the scope of this literature review. There is additional 
research on accountability in auditing that offers a different perspective on accountability (e.g. Roberts 1991). 
However, it is not captured here as this review focuses on experimental research. 
3 Research utilizing accountability theory as theoretical support, but not directly focused on investigating the effect 
of accountability pressure or individuals’ feelings of accountability, were excluded from this study (e.g. Cohen et al. 
2013). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Accountability Literature in Auditing 
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Early research on accountability in auditing focuses on investigating whether 
accountability pressure impacts auditor decision making. Most studies manipulate accountability 
(the independent variable) as either present or absent, while one study manipulates the amount of 
pressure (high vs. low). These manipulations often include information regarding whether the 
person to whom the auditor is accountable (i.e. accountability source) has or has not expressed a 
preference for a particular outcome, whether the preference of the accountability source is 
similar or dissimilar to that of the auditor, whether the auditor knows the preference of the 
accountability source before or after making their initial decision, or whether the auditor knows 
they are accountable for their decision before or after evaluating the audit evidence. Individuals 
often respond differently to accountability pressure when they have knowledge of the 
accountability source’s preferences compared to when they do not. More recently, however, 
research considers how different types of accountability pressure (process vs. outcome) and 
various sources of pressure (single vs. multiple persons to whom auditors are accountable) affect 
auditors.  
While examining the impact of accountability on auditor judgment and decision making, 
the dependent variables of interest vary, but they can be bifurcated into two broad categories- 
auditor inputs and auditor outputs associated with a decision outcome.  Auditor inputs represent 
factors related to the way in which auditors work to reach a conclusion, as well the amount of 
work auditors are willing to put forth.  Specifically, researchers evaluate the influence that 
accountability has on auditor effort, and auditor evidence evaluation and testing strategies.  
Auditor outputs represent the actual conclusions the auditors reach. Researchers analyze these 
variables differently, however the dependent variables of interest can be grouped into three 
categories- the auditors’ decisions, the auditors’ performance, and the decision characteristics. 
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Auditor decisions represent those outcomes for which there is no right or wrong answer.4 These 
decisions are often evaluated relative to the preference of an accountability source in order to 
draw inferences regarding the source’s influence. Auditor performance, on the other hand, is 
related to auditor decisions but suggests some level of quality- an assessment of whether those 
decisions are “good” or “bad”.  Often, performance is evaluated based on the correctness or 
accuracy of the decision. Lastly, decision characteristics reflect an overall evaluation of 
participants’ decisions relative to another treatment or control group. Decision characteristics 
related to decision consensus, consistency, and conservatism. Consensus suggests less variability 
amongst participants’ responses, while consistency indicates similar decisions are made in a 
similar manner. Conservatism relates to the aggressiveness of the participants’ decisions.  
Researchers also recognize that various task and individual characteristics strengthen or 
weaken (moderate) the relationship between accountability and outcome variables. 
Characteristics of the task or the decision environment moderate the relationship between 
accountability and the dependent variable of interest. The primary moderators that have been 
examined include use of a decision aid, auditor attributes, task characteristics, and client 
integrity.   
Other research takes a different focus and examines accountability as a moderator.  Prior 
research shows that factors such as heuristics and biases impact auditors’ decisions. In an effort 
to ascertain whether it is possible to mitigate the impact of those factors, researchers have 
investigated the moderating effect of accountability. That research examines the ability of 
                                                 
4 The term “decisions” rather than “judgments” is utilized to reflect that the auditor has made a choice about the 
issue presented. Per Bonner (1999), “decisions refer to making up one’s mind…and taking a course of action”, 
whereas judgments are simply the “…forming of an idea, opinion, or estimate...” (p.385). Frequently judgments 
precede decisions. 
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accountability to moderate the impact of other independent variables such as personal biases, 
task complexity, and perception of preparer error. 
While accountability is often examined based on the impact that it has on other variables, 
some research examines the impact that other variables have on accountability (i.e. the 
dependent variable). Academics have considered how environmental factors influence feelings 
or perceptions of accountability to gain a better understanding of the way in which the audit 
environment impacts auditor decisions. These factors include review format and type of 
standard. Figure 1 graphically depicts this framework and is the foundation for the following 
discussion of the literature. 
IV. Literature on Accountability Pressure 
 Accountability Pressure 
Examining the Extent of Accountability Pressure  
Research on accountability in auditing extensively evaluates the influence of 
accountability on auditor decision making. The findings indicate that accountability can 
positively influence auditor inputs by increasing cognitive effort (e.g. Johnson and Kaplan 2001; 
Tan et al. 1997), increasing the breadth of substantive testing (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; Koonce et 
al. 1995), and increasing identification of more useful audit procedures (DeZoort and Harrison 
2016). Accountability also improves auditor performance (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; Tan and Kao 
1999), as well as decision consensus, consistency, and conservatism (e.g. Ashton 1992; DeZoort 
et al. 2006, Johnson and Kaplan 2001). However, the effects of accountability aren’t always 
positive. In some circumstances, accountability can result in biased decision outcomes (e.g. 
Bierstaker and Wright 2005; Kaplan and Lord 2001)  
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   The Impact of Accountability Pressure on Decision Inputs: Accountability to a party 
with unknown preferences increases auditor effort (Asare et al. 2000; Buchman et al. 1996; 
DeZoort et al. 2006; DeZoort and Harrison 2016; Johnson and Kaplan 1991; Koonce et al. 1995; 
Tan et al. 1997).  Evidence also suggests that knowledge of an evaluative party’s preference 
related to the execution of the audit process has positive effects when these preferences are 
associated with conducting a more effective audit (Peecher 1996; Tuner 2001; Shankar and Tan 
2006). 
In executing the audit, auditors who are accountable to a source with unknown views 
exhibit increased cognitive effort when assessing the risk of inventory obsolescence (Tan et al. 
1997) and determining the appropriate audit opinion to issue when the client is involved in a 
lawsuit (Buchman et al. 1996), and display greater self-insight related to their decision-making 
process (Johnson and Kaplan 1991). Buchman et al. (1996), however, find that cognitive effort 
related to a reporting decision differs based on the parties to whom the auditor is accountable and 
the experience level of the participant. Experienced auditors accountable to an audit partner do 
not put forth significantly more cognitive effort than those who are not accountable, whereas 
those auditors accountable to the client do. This finding is surprising, as one would not expect 
effort levels to vary by accountability source due to the desire of an individual to reach a 
defensible conclusion when the preferences of an accountability source are unknown. 
Furthermore, inexperienced auditors do not differ in their effort levels across accountability 
conditions. The social contingency model does not theorize how experience may influence 
accountability, but the difference in findings related to experience is understandable in an audit 
setting. Participants who are not experienced in contingent liabilities may not be able to make 
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any decision regarding the case without significant effort, thus accountability has little impact on 
the decision-making process. 
Effort gains are not limited to the mere presence or absence of accountability. Research 
also indicates that various levels of accountability pressure have incremental effects on cognitive 
effort. Auditors susceptible to high levels of accountability pressure, displayed more cognitive 
effort than those susceptible to low levels of accountability pressure when completing a 
materiality assessment exercise (DeZoort et al. 2006). 5  
The positive effects of accountability extend beyond just cognitive effort. Auditors also 
exert more effort in executing assigned audit procedures. Specifically, accountability increases 
the breadth of testing related to an unexpected gross margin increase, which results in a greater 
extent of tests being conducted (Asare et al. 2000). Accountable auditors also document a greater 
breadth and depth of justifications in a planning memo related to their decision to revise the audit 
time budget (Koonce et al. 1995) and put forth more effort on a fraud brainstorming task by 
identifying more audit procedures that could be useful in detecting fraud (DeZoort and Harrison 
2016).  
When individuals are accountable to a party whose preferences are known prior to 
formulating their own decision, individuals tend to simply align their decisions with the 
preferences of the accountability source (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). This highlights a potential 
negative consequence of accountability. However, several studies in auditing find that 
accountability to a source with known preferences can have a positive effect on auditor behavior. 
                                                 
5 Lerner and Tetlock (1999) acknowledge there are “several empirically distinguishable submanipulations” (p. 255) 
of accountability. DeZoort et al. (2006) is the only study to investigate these different accountability manipulations 
in a single study. Accountability is manipulated at four levels (from low to high)- anonymity, review, justification, 
and feedback. 
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When preferences of the accountability source are related to the way in which the audit should be 
conducted, as opposed to the conclusions that should be reached, positive effects can be seen.6 
Auditors accountable to reviewers who prefer a more skeptical approach to conducting an 
accounts receivable (AR) collectability review evaluated a statistically similar amount of 
evidence as those accountable to a reviewer whose preference was unknown (Turner 2001). 
These amounts were both significantly greater than the amount of evidence reviewed by auditors 
accountable to a reviewer with a preference for efficiency and leveraging client insights.   
Peecher (1996) also finds that the firms’ preference regarding the way in which their auditors 
approach analytical procedures impacts auditors’ consideration of evidence.  Auditors’ assess the 
extent to which a client’s explanation reflects the real reason for an unexpected increase in gross 
margin differently depending on their firm’s preference. However, this effect is only seen when 
the client is of high integrity.  
While information related to the preferences of an accountability source regarding the 
execution of the audit process can increase auditor effort, one study suggests that auditor effort is 
also influenced by whether known preferences are similar or dissimilar to the preferences of the 
accountable party (Shankar and Tan 2006). A key difference between Shankar and Tan (2006), 
and the Peecher (1996) and Turner (2001) study just discussed is that the accountability source in 
Shankar and Tan (2006) stated a preference related to a decision outcome, rather than a 
preference related to the execution of the audit process.  When the initial preference of the 
accountable party and the preference of the accountability source differ regarding an adjustment 
                                                 
6 This is similar to process accountability, where individuals are accountable for the process used in reaching a 
decision rather than the decision itself. However, in the studies looking at the direct impact of accountability 
pressure, participants are not explicitly told whether they are accountable for their decision-making process of 
decision outcome. 
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to the allowance for doubtful accounts, auditors with high levels of technical and tacit 
managerial knowledge spend more time formulating a memo justifying their decision and 
document a greater breadth of issues. This increased cognitive effort appears to be related to 
persuasively supporting their initial decision that is inconsistent with the preference of the party 
to whom they are accountable.7 In other situations, where preferences of the accountability 
source are known, accountability does not result in increased effort. Buchman et al. (1997) find 
no evidence of increased auditor effort in deciding whether to disclose a lawsuit when auditors 
are accountable to a source with known preferences compared to auditors who are not 
accountable for their decision. Similar to Shankar and Tan (2006), these preferences are for a 
particular decision outcome. 
Research suggests accountability can positively impact the way in which auditors execute 
their audit procedures, resulting in increased effort, more thorough testing, and a more critical 
evaluation of evidence.  However, the beneficial effects of accountability seem to be in situations 
where the accountability source’s preferences are unknown, or are known but related to a more 
effective execution of the audit process. Known preferences regarding a decision outcome can 
also increase effort but seemingly occurs when the accountable party reaches an initial 
conclusion prior to being told they are accountable for their decision, and the preferences of the 
accountability source and the accountable party differ.  Otherwise, accountability to a party with 
known preferences related to a decision outcome is associated with no increases in auditor effort 
when compared to those who are not accountable.   
                                                 
7 Auditor participants had the opportunity to revise their initial decision after discovering their work would be 
reviewed by a manager and the preferences of the manager. However, the majority of auditors (72%) opted to stay 
with their initial decision. Furthermore, the authors note that those auditors who did switch their decision to align 
with the preferences of the reviewer would also likely put for more effort in justifying their decision to demonstrate 
that the change in decisions was “for good reasons.” (Shankar and Tan, 2006 p. 479) 
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The Impact of Accountability Pressure on Decision Outputs: Accountability affects not 
only auditors’ effort and testing strategies, but it also influences their decisions and performance, 
as well as certain decision characteristics. Only one study finds accountability to have no effect 
on auditors’ decision (Koonce et al. 1995). Accountability to parties with unknown preferences 
often positively influences auditor outcomes by increasing judgment consensus (Ashton 1990; 
Ashton 1992; Johnson and Kaplan 1991; DeZoort et al. 2006), increasing judgment conservatism 
(DeZoort et al. 2006), increasing judgment consistency (Ashton 1992), and improving auditor 
performance (Asare et al. 2000; Ashton 1992; Tan and Kao 1999). However, when the views of 
an accountability source are unknown but can be inferred by the accountable party, negative 
auditor outcomes can occur (Buchman et al. 1996; Lord 1992). In this situation, auditors respond 
in a manner similar to individuals who are accountable to a source with known preferences.  
Accountability to parties with known preferences often has detrimental outcomes. Auditors tend 
to simply align their decisions with the preferences of the accountability source (e.g. Bierstaker 
and Wright 2005; Cohen and Trompeter 1996; Tan et al. 1997), presenting concerns regarding 
auditor objectivity which has implications for audit quality. However, when known preferences 
are related to the execution an effective audit, and decision outcomes are made to reflect these 
preferences, the concern may not necessarily be related to audit quality, but rather audit 
efficiency.  
Koonce et al. (1995) find accountability to a partner with unknown views has no impact 
on auditors’ time budget decisions in response to an unexpected gross margin increase, even 
when auditors offer a greater breadth and depth of justifications in the audit planning memo.8  
                                                 
8 Robertson (2007) also finds that students, as proxies for staff auditors, are not influenced by their senior’s 
preference. In a subjective audit task, participants were asked how willing they would be to report a subjective issue 
concerning repairs and maintenance expenses close to the end of fieldwork.  He found that the senior’s preference 
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Surprisingly, this suggests the increased effort that accountable auditors put forth in the decision-
making process does not result in decision outcomes that significantly differ from auditors who 
were not accountable.  
Conversely, Lord (1992) finds that accountability does significantly influence auditors’ 
reporting decisions.  Audit managers who expect a national office partner to review their work 
are less likely to issue an unqualified audit opinion compared to auditors who are not 
accountable for their decision.  Buchman et al. (1996) also find that accountability influences 
auditor’s reporting decisions. They find the effects of accountability to be dependent upon 
auditor experience. Participants who have experience with contingent liabilities related to a 
lawsuit and are accountable to the client, recommend issuing an unqualified opinion, while 
experienced participants accountable to the partner support issuing a qualified opinion.9 
Interestingly, while these studies do not explicitly state the preferences of the accountability 
source, participants’ decisions are influenced in a manner that suggests the participants speculate 
the preferences of the accountability source and respond accordingly.  In an audit reporting 
context, these findings are not surprising, as auditors likely know the preferences of an 
accountability source. This is consistent with Lerner and Tetlock (1999) who state that “…when 
participants…can guess the views of their prospective audience…[they] abandon their effortful 
                                                 
for either a quality audit or meeting the deadline for completing field work did not influence the participants’ 
decisions. This study did not operationalize accountability in any manner, which may be attributing to these results. 
The results may also be due to the inexperience of the student participants who may have overall uncertainty on how 
to handle the issue, thus they default to disclosing the issue to their senior.  
9 Participants were aware of the partner and client’s preferences regarding disclosure. However, preferences related 
to the appropriate opinion were not explicitly stated. It is expected, however, that in this setting where disclosure 
preferences are provided, that the auditors could have speculated the preferences of partner and client and made 
decisions accordingly. 
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attempts to reach a justifiable position and simply shift toward the presumed views of the 
prospective audience” (p.257). 
While decision outcomes may not always be positively affected by accountability 
pressure, accountability pressure does positively influence certain decision characteristics. 
Ashton (1990) and Ashton (1992) find that auditors who are required to justify their decisions 
related to a bond rating task display greater decision consensus than individuals who are not 
required to justify their decisions.10  Johnson and Kaplan (1991) also find accountable auditors to 
have greater consensus in their risk assessments related to inventory obsolescence compared to 
auditors who are not accountable.  DeZoort et al. (2006) find positive effects due to increased 
accountability pressure, which also results in less decision variability (i.e. greater decision 
consensus), as well as increased conservatism in auditors’ materiality decisions. Ashton (1992) 
finds increased consistency in an auditor’s decision making process across similar decisions, 
indicating a consistent application of knowledge by the auditor.  
The positive effects of accountability on certain decision characteristics also appear to be 
associated with improved auditor performance in certain circumstances. Ashton (1992) finds a 
justification requirement improves auditor accuracy on a bond rating exercise.11 Asare et al. 
(2000) also see performance gains due to accountability pressure. They find that accountability 
increases auditors’ ability to identify the reason for an account fluctuation. This improvement in 
performance is attributable to the increased breadth of testing that the auditors conduct. Tan and 
                                                 
10 This study did not operationalize accountability beyond requiring written justification and the submission of the 
participant’s justification sheet at the end of the experiment. However, as the participants were practicing auditors, 
and the study was conducted at a firm training session, participants likely felt as though their responses may be 
reviewed by an evaluative other within the firm.   
11 Ashton (1990) also finds increased decision accuracy (i.e. performance) on a bond rating task. However, the 
increase is not statistically significant. 
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Kao (1999) also find that auditor accountability improves performance, but only on medium and 
high complexity tasks when certain levels of knowledge and problem solving ability are present.  
As discussed above, accountability to parties within unknown views can have a positive 
influence on auditor decision making outputs. However, the positive effect of accountability 
diminishes when individuals are accountable to parties with known or speculated preferences. In 
this situation, accountability influences auditor decision making such that auditors make 
decisions that align more closely with the preferences of the accountability source, essentially 
introducing bias into the audit process.12  Accountability can also negatively affect auditors’ 
decisions related to audit planning (Bierstaker and Wright 2005), inventory obsolescence risk 
assessments (Tan et al. 1997), and acceptance of client proposed accounting treatments (Cohen 
and Trompeter 1996, Kaplan and Lord 2001). One exception is Buchman et al. (1996), who find 
that the preferences of the accountability source do not always influence auditors’ decisions.  
Furthermore, auditors are not only influenced by knowing the views of the party to whom they 
are accountable, but recent research suggests the point at which auditors are informed of their 
superior’s preferences has an impact on the decision outcomes (Peytcheva and Gillett 2011; 
Wilks 2002). 
Bierstaker and Wright (2005) find that partner preferences regarding the audit approach 
influence auditors’ audit planning decisions. When partners prefer a balanced audit approach, 
auditors appear to alter budgeted hours in a manner that is consistent with their audit risk 
assessments, as would be expected.13 However, when auditors are accountable to partners with a 
                                                 
12 This statement is not to suggest bias is good or bad, but rather that it exists.  Whether the effect of accountability 
is positive or negative in situations that require auditor judgments and the views of evaluative other are known is 
subjective. 
13 There was a positive relationship between risk assessments and planned testing for auditors accountable to a 
partner with a preference for a balance audit approach. However, this relationship was not significant.  
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preference for efficiency, the results suggest that budgeted hours and planned tests are not risk 
adjusted, but rather reflect the partner’s preference for an efficient audit.  Tan et al. (1997) also 
find auditors to be influenced by their superior’s preference. Auditors’ risk assessments related to 
inventory obsolescence are significantly different for auditors with knowledge of their partner’s 
preference compared to auditors who have no knowledge of their partner’s preference. 
Furthermore, a partner’s attitude regarding client continuance, and the types of clients to retain, 
influences audit manager’s likelihood of accepting the client’s proposed treatment for research 
and development costs (Cohen and Trompeter 1998). Auditors respond in a similar manner when 
they can speculate the preferences of the person to whom they are accountable. Kaplan and Lord 
(2001) find accountable audit managers alter self- judgments to conform to what they speculate 
the partner’s preference to be when dealing with a subjective reporting decision.14  
Counter to Tetlock’s social contingency model and the findings of many auditing studies, 
Buchman et al. (1996) find that accountability to a party with known preferences does not 
influence auditors’ decision to disclose a lawsuit. Auditors accountable to the client do not make 
disclosure decisions that are significantly different from auditors accountable to the partner, as 
most participants adopt the partner’s preference and recommend disclosure (Buchman et al. 
1996). This finding may be attributable to the two dependent variables in the case. Participants 
were required to make a disclosure decision regarding a contingent lawsuit, as well as a reporting 
decision. One reason participants might not align their decision with the preferences of the client 
                                                 
14 Kaplan and Lord (2001) also expected participants to increase cognitive effort in this situation, as they would 
employ a “hybrid” strategy to deal with the uncertainty regarding the accountability source’s preference. This hybrid 
strategy would involve thorough information processing in order to respond any objections by the accountability 
source but a decision outcome that aligns with the preferences they believe the accountability source has. They did 
not find results related to effort, which I speculate is attributable to the limited uncertainty regarding the preference 
of a national partner in the reporting case scenario provided. 
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when making the disclosure decision, is they feel a client would be less contentious about the 
requirement of a footnote disclosure, as opposed to the issuance of an unfavorable audit opinion. 
Furthermore, auditors may have placed a bit more importance on the disclosure decisions, as 
deciding whether to disclose the lawsuit made the difference between investors having some or 
no information regarding the potential contingent liability.   
The timing of when an individual becomes aware of an accountability source’s 
preference also appears to influence decisions in certain situations (Wilks 2002; Peytcheva and 
Gillet 2011). Research suggests that obtaining knowledge of a superior’s preference prior to 
evidence evaluation, as opposed to after, results in greater decision alignment with the superior’s 
preference. Knowledge of the superior’s preference prior to evidence evaluation influences the 
way in which auditors think about the evidence (Wilks 2002). Furthermore, when knowledge of 
a superior’s preference comes after one’s own judgment has been formed, auditors appear to 
adjust their original judgment to align with their superior’s preference. There is no significant 
difference in judgments between auditors who are informed of their superior’s preference before 
or after formulating their own decision, suggesting auditors align their decisions with the 
preferences of their superior in both situations (Peytcheva and Gillet 2011).  Interestingly, 
Peytcheva and Gillet (2011) find somewhat different results from Shankar and Tan (2006). 
Shankar and Tan (2006) find that auditors do not tend to alter decisions so that they align with a 
reviewer’s preferences but rather put forth increased effort in documenting their justification for 
their conclusion. The difference in findings may be due to documented evidence of altering one’s 
decision to conform to the reviewer’s preference. In Shankar and Tan (2006), auditors are 
required to document their initial decision, whereas Peytcheva and Gillet (2006) simply require 
participants to acknowledge they made a decision without documenting the conclusion. 
26 
Accountability research focusing on auditor outcomes suggests accountability can 
positively influence auditor decisions, auditor decision characteristics, and performance. 
However, these positive effects appear to be limited to situations where the preference of the 
accountability source is unknown. Accountability to sources with known or speculated 
preferences generally results in decision alignment, regardless of when in the decision process 
auditors are informed of these preferences. 
Overall, the auditing literature examining accountability pressure often finds that 
accountability benefits auditor judgment and decision making.  However, these benefits appear 
to be dependent upon whether the views of the accountability source are known or unknown, as 
well as the type of preference that the accountability source has—whether the preference is 
related to the execution of the audit, or the decision the auditor should reach. Accountability 
appears to have harmful effects on auditor inputs and auditor outputs under three different 
circumstances: (1)when an accountability source’s preferences for a decision outcome are 
known, (2) when an accountability source’s preferences regarding the execution of the audit are 
known and call for ineffective or overly efficient auditor conduct, thus sacrificing audit quality, 
and (3) when auditors can speculate as to the accountability source’s preferences regarding a 
decision outcome. Accountability to individuals with unknown views generally has positive 
effects on auditor inputs and auditor outputs, unless one can speculate as to the accountability 
source’s preference regarding a decision outcome.  On the other hand, accountability to 
individuals with known views generally has negative effects on auditor inputs and auditor 
outputs, unless the preference is related to effectively executing the audit process. 
As with any research stream, some studies find results counter to theoretical expectations. 
Buchman et al. (1996) did not find accountability pressure to a party with known preferences 
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regarding a disclosure decision influences auditors’ disclosure decisions. Koonce (1995) did not 
find accountability pressure to a party with unknown views influences auditors’ decisions, even 
though the accountable participants appear to engagement in a more cognitively effortful 
decision making process. Future research should continue to investigate situations where 
accountability functions differently in an audit setting, and consider environmental features and 
personal attributes that interact with the accountability pressure. 
Examining the Type of Pressure: Process vs. Outcome  
Outcome accountability represents accountability for an individual’s final decision or 
outcome, whereas process accountability represents accountability for the process one went 
through to reach their decision (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).  Early auditing research on 
accountability does not distinguish between these two types of accountability.  Very little 
auditing research to date investigates the effects of process and outcome accountability on 
auditor decision making. Peecher et al. (2014) propose an accountability framework composed of 
two dimensions- penalties and rewards vs. process accountability and outcome accountability. 
Their framework highlights the accountability mechanisms used in the current environment and 
draws attention to the absence of mechanisms focused on process accountability. However, 
Peecher et al. (2014) propose that employing such mechanisms may be a more beneficial for 
improving auditor decision making.   
Only one experimental audit study to date has sought to directly investigate the effects of 
process and outcome accountability on auditor effort and decision making. Kim and Trotman 
(2014) investigate the influence of accountability type on auditors’ level of professional 
skepticism.  In the outcome accountability condition, participants are informed that they may be 
contacted and “asked to justify and provide explanations for their final judgment on the 
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likelihood of a material misstatement”, while participants in the process accountability condition 
are told they may be contacted and “asked to justify and provide explanations for the judgment 
process they used leading up to their final judgment on the likelihood of a material 
misstatement” (p.11). 
Kim and Trotman (2014) find that auditor skepticism and cognitive effort related to an 
analytical review task increase when participants are accountable for their decision-making 
processes, compared to when they are accountable for their decision outcomes. Furthermore, 
participants generate significantly more plausible explanations for an unexpected account 
fluctuation when they are accountable for their process, rather than outcome. Research also 
suggests the effect of process accountability is greatest for novice auditors (Kim and Trotman 
2014). 
Although no general conclusions can be drawn based on one research study, it is evident 
that additional research in this area is needed. Understanding how process and outcome 
accountability may influence the way in which auditors conduct the audit and the decisions that 
they make is important. 
Examining the Source of Accountability Pressure: Single vs. Multiple 
Very little research in the last two decades considers the influence of multiple 
accountability relationships on auditors’ decision making processes. However, accounting 
researchers frequently acknowledges the presence of multiple accountability pressures in the 
auditing environment (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996). Multiple 
accountability relationships refer to auditors’ accountability to multiple sources, including 
supervisors, clients, regulatory bodies, etc.  An early study on accountability in accounting 
collected questionnaire data from accountants in public practice and evaluated their responses 
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associated with a situation where they faced multiple accountability pressures (Gibbins and 
Newton 1994). They evaluate accountants’ responses to multiple accountability pressures in 
situations where the accountability sources agree or disagree, the accountable party’s initial 
position was the same as or different from those of the accountability sources, and the strength of 
accountability pressure felt by the accountable party varies. Overall, Gibbins and Newton (1994) 
do find these three factors are associated with the course of action an accountant takes when 
responding to multiple accountability pressures. However, the experience of a delay in the 
decision-making process is only related to two of the three factors, as the strength of 
accountability pressure is not associated with delay. The results of this study support the 
expanded model of accountability that Gibbins and Newton (1994) propose and suggest is 
necessary to evaluate accountability in a professional setting. 
While Gibbins and Newton (1994) used a field questionnaire to investigate auditor 
responses to multiple accountability pressures, very limited experimental research investigates 
auditor decision making in a multiple accountability setting. The limited work that has been done 
in the area considers how managing multiple accountability pressures impacts auditor affect and 
performance (Bagley 2010), and auditor decision-making (Gramling 1999; Bierstaker and 
Wright 2001).  
Bagley (2010) investigates the influence of multiple accountability pressure on auditor 
affect and auditor performance. She finds that auditors experience negative affective reactions to 
accountability pressure from multiple parties. Negative affect is significantly higher for auditors 
facing multiple accountability pressures, compared to auditors accountable to a single source and 
those auditors who are not accountable. She finds that increased negative affect diminishes task 
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performance, but only on low complexity tasks. High task complexity results in poor 
performance regardless of accountability pressures.  
Gramling (1999) and Bierstaker and Wright (2001) investigate the effect that client and 
partner pressure have on auditors’ planning decisions. Gramling (1999) subjects auditors to 
pressure from both the client and the partner and finds that auditors planning decisions related to 
budgeted audit hours are significantly influenced by the client’s preference (lower fees or high-
quality audit), regardless of the partner’s preference (efficiency and profitability or quality and 
skepticism). This suggests that only the client’s preference influenced the auditors’ decisions.  
Interestingly, Bierstaker and Wright (2001) find similar results. They investigate the auditor’s 
willingness to change the budgeted audit hours and planned tests from the prior year when faced 
with partner pressure and client fee pressure. They manipulate partner pressure as present 
(preference for efficiency) or absent (no preference) and client fee pressure as present (fees 
reduced from prior year) or absent (fees are same as last year). Results show that the fee pressure 
significantly impacts the auditor’s change in budgeted audit hours, but there is no main effect for 
partner pressure.  However, they do find that both client fee pressure and partner pressure affect 
the percentage change in the number of planned tests.  Participants subject to both client fee 
pressure and partner pressure also make significantly greater reductions in planned tests 
compared to those in either pressure condition suggesting the multiple pressures have an additive 
effect in influencing auditor decision making related to planned testing. 
Research acknowledges the presence of multiple accountability pressure in auditing, yet 
limited research investigates its effect on auditor decision making. Bagley (2010) provides 
evidence that multiple accountability pressures increase negative affect, thus hindering 
performance on low complexity tasks. However, little is known about how specific sources of 
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pressure influence decisions. Gramling (1999) and Bierstaker and Wright (2001) find some 
evidence that in a client/partner pressure setting, the client’s preference more heavily influences 
auditors’ decisions. These results should be considered in light of the operationalization of 
accountability in both studies. Accountability to each pressure source (partner and client) was not 
operationalized separately.  Participants were accountable for their performance on the overall 
task by providing their name and a justification for their decision, which may be reviewed by 
their firm partner and/or researcher. The partner and/or research may also follow up with 
participants about their decision.  It is unclear how auditors might respond if justification to both 
accountability sources is required. Future research should continue to investigate the influence 
that multiple accountability pressures have on auditor decision making. 
Examining the Impact of Environmental Factors on Accountability Pressure 
 Research that considers how an auditor’s environment influences their feelings of 
accountability is limited. However, some research related to the review process (Brazel et al. 
2004), and types of accounting standards (Peytcheva et al. 2014) investigates the influence that 
these elements have on perceived accountability and audit outcomes.15 
Face-to-face delivery of review comments has positive effects on auditor effort and 
decisions. Brazel et al. (2004) attributes the positive results to increased feelings of 
accountability. Auditors anticipating face-to-face delivery of review notes experienced greater 
feelings of accountability than auditors anticipating electronic delivery of review notes. These 
                                                 
15 Additional papers consider how the review process (Payne et al. 2010) and auditing standards (Hackenbrack and 
Nelson 1996; Cohen et al. 2013) influence auditor decisions. However, they do not directly manipulate 
accountability or measure feelings of accountability, but rather utilize accountability as theoretical support for their 
expectations.  
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increased feelings of accountability result in increased time spent on a going concern evaluation 
task and higher judgment quality compared to auditors receiving electronic reviews.  
 Accounting standards have significant influence on the judgments and decisions of 
auditors, as auditors work to ensure that a company’s financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with these standards. Peytcheva et al. (2014) investigate how two types of auditing 
standards (rules vs. principles-based standards) influence auditors’ cognitive motivations and 
decisions in a lease classification task. They find that principle-based standards increase 
auditors’ feelings of process accountability. In turn, this improves auditors’ epistemic motivation 
and increases auditors’ demand for evidence. 
 As demonstrated above, elements of the audit environment can influence auditors’ 
feelings of accountability, which in turn affects decision outcomes. Significant research 
considers the impact that accountability pressure has auditor decision making, but additional 
research should investigate how various elements of the auditor’s work environment affect their 
feelings of accountability. It is important to understand how auditors are influenced by, and 
respond to, the environment within which they work. 
Understanding Factors that Moderate the Impact of Accountability Pressure  
To provide a better understanding of the way in which accountability influences auditor 
decision making, it is important to consider elements in the audit environment that may influence 
the effect that accountability has on auditor inputs and auditor outputs. Decisions aids, task 
complexity, auditor attributes, and client attributes have all been shown to moderate the impact 
of accountability on decision outcomes.  
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Decision aids have been shown to both diminish and magnify the effect of accountability 
on auditor decision making, thus providing mixed evidence regarding the influence that decision 
aids have on the relationship between accountability and auditor outcomes (Ashton 1990; 
DeZoort et al. 2006). Ashton (1990) finds a decision aid with high implicit performance 
standards hinders the positive effects that justification has on auditor performance.  Auditors who 
are provided a decision aid to use in a bond rating task show decreased performance accuracy 
and increased variability in responses when they must justify their decision regarding the 
appropriate bond ratings for several companies, compared to when no justification is required. 
Conversely, DeZoort et al. (2006) find that the presence of a decision aid improves the 
consistency and conservatism of decisions related to a materiality assessment when auditors are 
accountable for their decisions.   
Certain task characteristics and auditor attributes also influences the effectiveness of 
accountability. Tan and Kao (1999) find that the effect of accountability is moderated by task 
complexity, auditor knowledge, and auditor problem solving ability. Accountability is not 
effective at improving performance on a low complexity task. However, accountability’s 
effectiveness on medium to high complexity tasks depends on the auditor’s level of knowledge 
and their problem-solving ability. Accountability improves performance on medium-complexity 
tasks, but only when the auditor has an appropriate level of knowledge to complete the task.  On 
high-complexity tasks, the auditor must have the appropriate knowledge level and problem 
solving ability for accountability to effectively enhance performance. Buchman et al. (1996) 
finds results similar to Tan and Kao (1999) in that the impact of accountability is limited to the 
judgments of auditors with task specific knowledge, thus suggesting knowledge is an important 
factor in determining the effectiveness of accountability. Also related to Tan and Kao (1999), 
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Bagley (2010) investigates the influence that multiple accountability pressures have on the 
completion of both high and low-complexity tasks. She finds that the performance decline 
caused by multiple accountability pressures (via negative affect) is only seen in situations where 
task complexity is low. Auditor performance is not impacted by multiple accountability 
pressures on highly complex tasks.    
Lastly, Peecher (1996) investigates the ability of client integrity to mitigate the influence 
of audit partner preferences on auditors’ decisions. He finds that auditors accountable to a 
partner more concerned with auditor efficiency and cost (credence preference) assess a higher 
likelihood that the client’s explanation accounted for much of the change in an account balance, 
compared to those accountable to a partner with a preference for objectivity (skepticism 
preference). However, this finding only holds when client integrity is high. For low integrity 
clients, likelihood assessments did not differ significantly.    
Overall, multiple factors associated with the audit task, the auditor, and the client are 
shown to moderate the relationship between accountability and performance. Research shows 
that accountability is only effective when auditors have the ability and the appropriate level of 
knowledge or experience to complete their assigned tasks (Buchman et al. 1996, Tan and Kao 
1999).  It also suggests that a partner’s preference for either an efficient or effective audit only 
influences auditors’ decisions regarding the acceptance of a client’s explanation when the client 
is of high integrity (Peecher 1996). Thus, the effectiveness of accountability is contingent upon 
client integrity in certain situations. 
Research investigating task complexity and accountability is inconclusive, as 
accountability is found to be ineffective in situations where task complexity is low (Tan and Kao 
1999), yet it is also found to be ineffective in situations where task complexity is high (Bagley 
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2010). These findings suggest there are boundary conditions related to task complexity such that 
when a task is too difficult, accountability will have no effect as performance will be poor 
regardless of accountability pressure, and when a task is too easy, accountability will have no 
effect as the task is so simple all participants will do well. 
Furthermore, research on the effect of decision aids on accountability have also been 
mixed. Ashton (1990) shows the presence of a decision aid diminishes auditor’s decision quality, 
while DeZoort et al. (2006) find decision aids improve accountable auditors’ decision quality. 
This difference may be attributable to a variety of factors such as the type of aid provided or the 
type of decision task utilized. However, future research should continue to investigate those 
situations in which the presence of a decision aid improves versus diminishes decision quality. 
The Impact of Accountability Pressure as a Moderator of Factors Affecting Decisions 
 Accountability does not only directly affect auditor performance, but does so indirectly as 
well.  Accountability has been shown to mitigate certain personal biases, as well as the effect of 
task complexity and perception of preparers on auditor decision making. 
Kennedy (1993) and Kennedy (1995) focus on accountability as a bias-reducing 
mechanism. Kennedy (1993) speculates that accountability can successfully mitigate personal 
biases that are effort related, but not those that are data related. Data related biases occur when 
the auditor’s knowledge or memory (i.e. internal data) or environmental cues (i.e. external data) 
related to the decision context are faulty or inadequate. She finds evidence that accountability 
mitigates recency bias, an effort related bias, when individuals are unfamiliar with an assigned 
task. Participants who are told they are accountable for their decisions prior to evidence 
evaluation exhibit no recency bias, compared to individuals who are told they are accountable for 
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decisions after evidence evaluation and those who are not accountable at all. On the other hand, 
participants familiar with the task showed no evidence of recency bias in any condition. 
Furthermore, Kennedy (1995) finds evidence to support her expectation that accountability will 
not mitigate data-related biases. She conducts two experiments and finds that accountability does 
not mitigate the curse of knowledge bias in a going concern assessment task or analytical review 
task. The curse of knowledge reflects the inability of individuals to disregard information they 
previously processed.  
Tan and Tan (2008) consider whether accountability can overcome the tendency of 
workpaper preparers and reviewers to incorporate previously invalidated evidence into their 
decision-making process.  Specifically, they investigate whether preparers and reviewers adjust 
likelihood assessments regarding their clients’ chances of winning a significant contract after 
receiving information that the evidence indicating the client would win is invalidated. 
Accountability is operationalized by informing the workpaper preparers that their responses will 
be read by a faculty member performing the role of a reviewer. Workpaper reviewers are told 
their responses will be read by a graduate student performing the role of a preparer. Tan and Tan 
(2008)) find that both reviewers and preparers are unable to fully remove the invalidated 
information from their judgments, such that they continue to make significantly different 
judgments from the group that does not initially receive the invalidated information.  However, 
accountability moderates the effect of invalidated evidence for reviewers, but not preparers.  
These results are somewhat surprising given Kennedy’s (1995) finding that accountability does 
not mitigate the curse of knowledge. The curse of knowledge (Kennedy 1995) and the 
consideration of invalidated evidence (Tan and Tan 2008) appear to be similar biases, both of 
which are data related biases per Kennedy’s (1995) framework. As such, one would not expect 
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accountability to mitigate the tendency of individuals to consider previously invalidated evidence 
in one’s decision making process. 
A separate study considers the impact of process accountability on the status quo 
heuristic- the tendency to keep things as they are rather than make a change. Messier et al. 
(2014) investigate whether auditors are subject to the status quo heuristic when there is a change 
from principles to rules based accounting, such that they continue to employ the principles based 
approach under the new rules based accounting guidance. They then investigate whether process 
accountability can moderate the effect of the status quo heuristic. Process accountability is 
operationalized as high or low by informing participants either before or after making their 
decision, respectively, that they are required to justify their decisions to the partner on the 
engagement and he is concerned with the process used to reach their final decision.  Participants 
are required to decide the appropriate treatment for current year research and development costs. 
They find that high process accountability does mitigate the effect of the status quo heuristic. 
Accountability is not always expected to mitigate the relationship between an 
independent variable and dependent variable.  In certain situations, it is expected to exacerbate 
the relationship.  Glover (1997) and Hoffman and Patton (1997) evaluate the tendency of 
accountability to magnify the dilution effect, as has been demonstrated in social psychology 
research (Tetlock and Boettger 1989). The dilution effect reflects individuals’ tendency to 
incorporate non-diagnostic information in their decision-making processes. Glover (1997) 
expects accountability will exacerbate the dilution effect due to increased cognitive processing of 
information. Auditor participants perform an AR risk assessment task. Participants assess the risk 
of material misstatement in AR after reviewing several pieces of audit evidence. Counter to 
social psychology research, Glover (1997) finds that accountability has no impact on the dilution 
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effect; however, he finds evidence to suggest that time pressure may mitigate the dilution effect. 
Similarly, Hoffman and Patton (1997) also find that accountability does not exacerbate the 
dilution effect. Auditors complete a fraud risk assessment task where they are given relevant and 
irrelevant information related to the risk of fraud.  Accountable auditors are expected to make 
lower fraud risk assessments, suggesting the inclusion of irrelevant information in their decision 
processes. However, accountable and non-accountable auditors do not significantly differ in the 
magnitude of the dilution effect. Conversely, Favere-Marchesi and Pincus (2006) also investigate 
the influence of accountability on the dilution effect utilizing internal auditors as participants. 
The authors not only consider the magnitude of the dilution effect but also the frequency. They 
anticipate accountable auditors will experience the dilution effect less frequently; however, when 
it does occur, the magnitude of the effect will be greater than when the auditor is not 
accountable. This study provides some evidence that accountability diminishes the frequency 
with which dilution effect occurs. However, when the dilution effect does occur, accountability 
exacerbates its magnitude (Favere-Marchesi and Pincus 2006).  
While accountability reduces the impact of certain heuristics and biases, it magnifies 
other relationships. Rich (2004) finds that accountability pressure strengthens the effect that 
perceived probability of preparer error has on the audit review process. He finds that a high 
perception of workpaper preparer error, which is magnified by high accountability pressure, 
results in a more highly critical thought process during the review. Furthermore, the number of 
highly critical thoughts during review is inversely related to the reviewer’s agreement with the 
preparer’s work, which in turn, is associated with amount of preparer follow up that is required. 
High accountability pressure exacerbates the positive relationship between perceived probability 
of preparer error and the extent of critical thought employed during review. 
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Research has also examined the extent to which accountability will moderate the 
relationship between task complexity and performance. While Tan and Kao (1999) conclude that 
task complexity moderates the impact of accountability, a follow up study by Tan et al. (2002) 
examines whether accountability moderates the impact of task complexity. Tan et al. (2002) 
assess the moderating effect of accountability (a proxy for motivation) and knowledge (a proxy 
for skills) on task complexity’s effect on performance. Utilizing the data from Tan and Kao 
(1999), they find that the relationship between task complexity and performance on a highly 
complex task is only moderated by accountability if participant knowledge is also high. 
Overall, these results suggest accountability is successful at mitigating certain effort 
related biases (Kennedy 1993, Messier et al. 2014), but findings are mixed on the ability of 
accountability to mitigate certain data related biases. Tan and Tan (2008) find that accountability 
can mitigate individuals’ tendencies to include invalidated evidence into their decision-making 
processes. However, this appears to be a data related bias similar to the curse of knowledge, and 
Kennedy (1995) does not find accountability to be successful at mitigating the curse of 
knowledge. As such, additional research is needed to more clearly determine the type of biases 
that accountability may successfully overcome. 
Furthermore, counter to findings from social psychology, research suggests that 
accountability does not appear to exacerbate the dilution effect, but may actually mitigate it. This 
is likely due to the nature of the audit environment coupled with auditors’ diligent information 
processing under high accountability pressure (Favere-Marchesi and Pincus 2006). In an auditing 
context, it is important that individuals consider the extent to which information cues are 
diagnostic versus non-diagnostic prior to formulating a decision. Thus, high accountability 
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pressure allows individuals to more effectively identify and disregard non-diagnostic 
information, resulting in decreased occurrences of the dilution effect.  
The relationship between a reviewer’s perception of preparer error and the extent of 
critical thought employed during the review process is exacerbated by accountability pressure. 
This finding can also be attributed to the more diligent information processing that occurs under 
high accountability pressure. Additionally, accountability pressure, in conjunction with high 
auditor knowledge, moderates the effect of task complexity on auditor performance when task 
complexity is high. 
V. Conclusion and Opportunities for Future Research 
Extensive experimental research on accountability in auditing has been conducted over 
the last two decades and has increased our understanding of the influence that accountability has 
on auditor effort, evidence evaluation and testing strategies, and decisions. Accountability 
improves auditor effort and decision making in many circumstances. It is also effective at 
mitigating various biases, as well as the negative impact that certain task characteristics have on 
audit outcomes. Accountability also explains the way in which various environmental factors 
affect auditor decision making. 
Given the extent to which accountability mechanisms are engrained in the audit 
environment, it is important to continue to investigate the effect that accountability has on the 
audit process and auditor decision making. A significant amount of research considers the impact 
of accountability to a single source, and shows that the accountability pressure often has a 
positive effect on auditor outputs and inputs. However, accountability pressure can have 
detrimental effects when auditors are aware of the preferences of the party to whom they are 
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accountable, and those preferences relate to a decision outcome. When auditors are informed of 
the accountability source’s preference related to an effective execution of the audit process, 
auditors increase the amount of evidence reviewed, and display greater skepticism towards client 
provided explanations. Research also considers how the timing of these preferences influences 
auditors’ decisions. Wilks (2002) investigates how the timing of a partner’s preference (before or 
after evidence evaluation) influences decisions. In this case, the partner’s preference is related to 
their concern regarding the weighting of evidence. Future research should investigate the effects 
that timing has on decisions when a partner’s decision preference is known, yet evidence 
evaluation is required. Do auditors engage in decision alignment to the same extent in both 
situations? Related to timing, researchers may also want to consider how justification timing 
influences effort and decisions. Current research assumes any operationalization of justification 
to be immediate or in the near future.  Does the temporal distance related to justification affect 
audit outcomes? Furthermore, researchers should also continue to investigate the effect of similar 
and dissimilar preferences. Reactions to similar and dissimilar preferences may be dependent 
upon one’s views of the accountability source. Do auditors respond to similar and dissimilar 
preferences when the accountability source is not a person they hold in high regard? This issue 
could also be investigated without consideration of preference similarity. Does accountability 
influence auditors’ decisions when they do or do not think highly of the accountability source? 
Accountability type and accountability sources are both very under-researched. 
Researchers have just started to consider the influence that process and outcome accountability 
have on auditor decision making. Peecher et al. (2014) proposes research questions related to 
accountability type, primarily focusing on the implementation of an auditor judgment rule. Given 
the multiple accountability pressures that auditors face, research should consider how auditors 
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respond to differing accountability types. How are auditors’ decisions influenced by two 
accountability sources, one with a focus on outcome accountability and the other with a focus on 
process accountability?  
Auditors’ management of multiple accountability pressures is another very under-
researched area given the reality of these pressures in the audit work environment. There are 
many research opportunities associated with auditors’ management of multiple accountability 
pressures, particularly when they have preferences that are conflicting. Do auditors’ relationships 
with, and attitudes towards, multiple accountability sources influence auditors’ decisions (i.e. 
respect for the individual, credibility of the source, power level, personal identification with the 
source, etc.)?  Do auditor characteristics influence their response to multiple accountability 
pressures (work experience, task experience, confidence in ability, etc.)? Furthermore, 
researchers should also investigate how environmental characteristics associated with the 
multiple accountability pressures affect auditors. What impact does a difference in the physical 
location of each accountability source have on auditors’ decisions? 
Researchers should also continue to investigate issues that have found mixed results in 
the literature. Decisions aids have been found to mitigate and magnify the effect of 
accountability. Additional research should focus on identifying those circumstances where 
magnification and mitigation occur. Understanding how accountability influences various 
personal biases or heuristics should continually be evaluated due to the prevalence of 
accountability mechanisms in auditing. Does accountability mitigate the effect of ego depletion 
on auditor performance? Does accountability exacerbate or mitigate confirmation bias? Given 
the mixed results regarding data related biases, research should continue to investigate those 
circumstances where accountability will and will not mitigate data related biases. 
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Although significant research has been done related to accountability, the opportunities 
for future research are significant. Research in this is area is extremely important as auditors face 
multiple accountability mechanisms that continually influence the way audits are conducted and 
the conclusions that are reached. Furthermore, as the audit environment evolves with changes in 
technology, changes in auditing and accounting standards, and changes in regulatory oversight, 
research should continue to investigate how these changes affect auditor perceptions of 
accountability and auditor decision making processes. 
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Table 1: Table of Experimental Audit Literature on Accountability 
Study Journal Participants Task Outcome Measure Views Findings 
Asare, 
Trompeter, 
and Wright 
2000 
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
91 auditors 
(Big 6) 
Analytical 
Procedures Task 
- Extent, breadth, and depth 
of testing 
- Focus of testing 
- Decision performance 
Unknown - Accountability increases the 
number of tests auditors’ conduct, as 
well as the number of hypotheses 
tested 
- Accountability increases auditors’ 
focus on testing error causes for an 
unexpected account fluctuation. 
- Accountability indirectly affects 
performance through auditors’ 
changed testing strategies 
Ashton 1990 Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
182 KPMG 
Peat Marwick 
auditors 
Bond Rating 
Task 
- Judgment accuracy- 
number of correct bond 
ratings 
-Judgment variability 
Unknown - When no decision aid is present, a 
justification requirement on a bond 
rating task increases auditor accuracy 
and decreases decision variability 
among participants  
- The presence of a high performing 
decision aid in conjunction with a 
justification requirement, feedback, 
or an incentive decrease decision 
accuracy and variability relative to 
the presence of only the aid. 
Ashton 1992 Organizational 
Behavior and 
Human Decision 
Processes 
59 KPMG 
Peat Marwick 
auditors 
Bond Rating 
Task 
- Judgment accuracy- 
number of correct bond 
ratings 
- Judgment consistency 
- Judgment consensus 
Unknown -Auditors who were either required 
to justify their decisions or were 
provided the bond rating 
recommendations of a mechanical 
aid had greater judgment accuracy 
and consistency than a control group 
who was provided no aid and had no 
justification requirement. 
- The availability of a decision aid 
increases accuracy to a greater extent 
than the justification requirement. 
-Requiring justification is more 
effective at improving judgment 
consistency and consensus than the 
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Study Journal Participants Task Outcome Measure Views Findings 
presence of a mechanical decision 
aid. 
Bagley 2010 Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
136 auditors Internal control 
task and ratio 
analysis task 
- Measure of affect 
- Task performance 
Unknown 
and Known 
- Finds that increased accountability 
results in increased negative affect 
- Finds that increased negative affect 
only negatively impacts performance 
when task complexity is low 
Bierstaker 
and Wright 
2001 
Advances in 
Accounting 
83 auditors Planning - Percent change in 
budgeted hours from prior 
year 
- Change in number of 
planned test from prior year 
Known - Client fee pressure was found to 
impact auditors’ adjustments to the 
budgeted audit hours  
- Both client fee pressure and partner 
pressure impacted auditors’ 
adjustments to planned tests  
Bierstaker 
and Wright 
2005 
Advances in 
Accounting 
61 auditors 
(avg. of 46.2 
months of 
experience) 
Planning -Percent change in budgeted 
hours from prior year 
- Change in number of 
planned test from prior year 
Known '- Auditors accountable to a partner 
with preference for a balanced audit 
approach appear to alter budgeted 
hours (but not number of tests) in a 
manner that is consistent with their 
audit risk assessments 
- Auditors accountable to a partner 
with a preference for efficiency do 
not appear to appear to adjust 
budgeted hours and planned tests in a 
manner consistent with client risks 
(not risk adjusted), but rather in a 
manner that reflect the partner’s 
preference for an efficient audit.   
- In the balanced condition, auditors 
made higher risk assessments and 
demanded a greater number of tests 
and hours than those in the efficiency 
condition. 
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Study Journal Participants Task Outcome Measure Views Findings 
Brazel, 
Agoglia, and 
Hatfield 2004 
The Accounting 
Review 
45 audit 
seniors 
Reporting Going concern assessment 
and related workpaper 
documentation 
- Audit efficiency 
- Workpaper effectiveness 
- Judgment quality 
- Deviation from prior year 
- Documentation 
- Recall 
Unknown - Auditors anticipating a face to face 
review felt more accountable than 
auditors in the electronic review 
condition 
- Auditors anticipating a face to face 
review had higher quality judgments, 
deviated further from prior year 
assessments, had higher concern for 
effectiveness, and took more time 
than those anticipating electronic 
review 
-Auditors anticipating a face to face 
review also remember and document 
more evidence that does not align 
with prior year conclusions 
Buchman, 
Tetlock, and 
Reed 1996 
Journal of 
Business Finance 
and Accounting 
92 auditors Reporting - Decision regarding the 
appropriate method for 
disclosing a lawsuit 
-Decision regarding the 
appropriate opinion to issue 
for the client 
- List of important factors 
considered when making 
each decision 
Known - Accountability did not significantly 
affect the auditors’ disclosure 
decisions. 
- Finds that auditors with prior task 
experience who are accountable for 
their work make reporting decisions 
more consistent with the preferences 
of the party to whom they are 
accountable 
Cohen and 
Trompeter 
1998 
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
74 audit 
managers  
(Big 6) 
Client 
Acceptance 
- Level of effort that should 
be exerted to obtain (or 
retain) the client 
- Level of recommendation 
for accepting the client’s 
position related to R&D 
accounting 
Known - Auditors suggest putting forth more 
effort to keep an existing client, 
compared to obtaining a potential 
client 
- Partners with a more aggressive 
attitude towards practice 
development result in managers 
suggesting to- 
1.) put forth more effort to obtain or 
retain a client and 
2.) accept the client's preferred 
treatment for an R&D expense 
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DeZoort, 
Harrison, and 
Taylor 2006 
Accounting, 
Organizations 
and Society 
160 auditors Planning - Judgment regarding the 
appropriate planning 
materiality amount 
- Materiality of the proposed 
adjustment to the client's 
allowance for uncollectible 
accounts balance 
- Judgment explanations 
Unknown - Auditors subject to high 
accountability pressure (compared to 
those subject to low accountability 
pressure): 
1. are more conservative and have 
less variability in their materiality 
judgments. 
2. provide lower planning materiality 
recommendations 
3. indicate proposed adjustments 
were more material 
4. exert more effort on the 
experimental task 
DeZoort and 
Harrison 
2016 
Journal of 
Business Ethics 
241 external 
auditors 
637 internal 
auditors 
Fraud 
Brainstorming 
- Number of fraud related 
audit procedures identified 
when brainstorming 
-Assessment of auditor’s 
responsibility for detecting 
fraud 
Unknown -Accountable auditors feel more 
responsibility for fraud detection 
than anonymous auditors and they 
brainstormed a greater number of 
fraud related procedures. 
- External auditors feel most 
responsible for the detection of 
financial statement fraud, whereas 
internal auditors feel similar levels of 
responsibility for detecting financial 
statement fraud, misappropriation of 
assets, and corruption. 
Favere-
Marchesi and 
Pincus 2006 
Advances in 
Accounting 
Behavioral 
Research 
192 internal 
auditors 
Fraud Risk 
Assessment 
-Frequency of the dilution 
effect 
-Magnitude of the dilution 
effect 
Unknown - Accountability reduces the 
frequency of the dilution effect  
- However, when accountable and 
the dilution effect does occur, the 
magnitude of the effect is much 
greater than when not accountable 
- The accountability source 
(management or audit committee) 
had no effect on the findings related 
to the frequency and magnitude of 
the dilution effect.  
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Glover 1997 Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
156 auditors 
(Big 6) 
AR Risk 
Assessment 
- Assessment of risk of 
material misstatement for 
AR 
Unknown - Finds that accountability has no 
significant impact the dilution effect, 
but provides some evidence that time 
pressure reduces it. 
Gramling 
1999 
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
188 audit 
managers  
(Big 5) 
Planning - Adjustment to the 
preliminary time budget 
Known - Auditors adjust the time budget in a 
manner that aligns with the client's 
preference  
- Partner preference does not have an 
impact on auditors’ time budget 
adjustments 
Hoffman and 
Patton 1997 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
44 advanced 
in-charge 
auditors  
(Big 6) 
Fraud Risk 
Assessment 
- Assessment of fraud risk Unknown - Finds no evidence that 
accountability exacerbates the 
dilution effect. 
Johnson and 
Kaplan 1991 
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
101 auditors Inventory 
Obsolescence 
- Risk of inventory 
obsolescence 
Unknown - Auditors accountable for their work 
have greater consistency in their risk 
assessments and greater self-insight 
into their decision processes. 
Kaplan and 
Lord 2001 
International 
Journal of 
Auditing 
30 experienced 
audit managers 
Reporting - Likelihood of issuing an 
unqualified opinion 
Speculated - Auditors accountable to the 
national office partner tend to have 
their own judgments influenced by 
what they perceive the partner's 
preference to be. 
- Accountable auditors did not 
exhibit more thorough information 
processing, as was expected. 
Kennedy 
1993 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
58 executive 
MBA students 
171 audit 
managers 
Reporting - The likelihood the 
company will fail 
Unknown - For participants unfamiliar with a 
task, accountability mitigates recency 
bias 
- Participants familiar with the task 
did not exhibit recency bias 
Kennedy 
1995 
The Accounting 
Review 
147 MBA 
students and 
161 auditors 
Reporting - The likelihood the 
company will fail 
Unknown - Finds that accountability does not 
mitigate the curse of knowledge for 
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86 executive 
MBA students 
and 322 audit 
managers 
Analytical 
Review 
-Estimate of what others 
would predict the 
subsequent quarter sales to 
be for a hypothetical 
company 
- Likelihood assessment as 
to whether actual sales will 
be as high or low as a 
provided benchmark 
Unknown experienced or inexperienced 
participants 
Kim and 
Trotman 
2014 
Accounting and 
Finance 
31 auditors 
(Australian 
Big 4) and 32 
recent 
accounting 
graduates 
Analytical 
Review  
- Number of plausible 
explanations generated for 
an unexpected increase in 
sales 
Unknown - Novice auditors accountable for 
their judgment process were 
significantly more skeptical than 
novice auditors accountable for their 
judgment outcomes. 
Koonce, 
Anderson and 
Marchant 
1995 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
202 advanced-
in-charge 
auditors 
Planning - Revised time budget 
amount 
- Quantity and quality of 
justifications provided for 
time budget decision 
Unknown - Auditors anticipating review 
provide more justifications for their 
audit budget decision than those who 
do not anticipate review, however the 
final budget assessments do not vary 
between groups. 
Lord 1992 Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
30 experienced 
audit managers 
Reporting - Likelihood of issuing an 
unqualified opinion 
- Yes/No decision on 
whether to issue a qualified 
opinion  
Unknown - Auditors accountable to their firm 
are less likely to issue an unqualified 
opinion in an audit-client conflict 
setting than auditors who were not 
accountable  
Messier, 
Quick, and 
Vandervelde 
2014 
Accounting, 
Organizations 
and Society 
74 U.S. 
auditors 
47 Norwegian 
auditors 
Research and 
Development 
Task 
-Decision regarding the 
appropriate treatment 
(capitalization vs. expense) 
for R&D expenditures 
Not 
Applicable 
- In the low process accountability 
condition, auditors recommend 
different accounting treatments based 
on the treatment of a similar event in 
the prior year. 
- In high process accountability 
condition, auditors are not affected 
by the prior year treatment of a 
similar accounting event—high 
process accountability mitigates the 
status quo effect 
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Peecher 1996 Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
106 auditors 
(Big 6) 
Analytical 
Review Task 
-Likelihood assessment that 
the client's explanation 
regarding an income 
increasing account 
fluctuation accounted for 
substantially all of the 
fluctuation in the account 
- Search for explanations 
counter to the client's 
Known - Auditors accountable to a partner 
concerned with incurring 
unnecessary cost in the investigation 
of account fluctuations assess a 
higher likelihood that the client's 
explanation explains a majority of 
the fluctuation in an account balance, 
compared to those accountable to a 
partner with a skepticism preference  
- The effect of client preference on 
auditor's likelihood assessment is 
moderated by the level of client 
integrity such that client preferences 
mattered more in the high integrity 
condition. 
Peytcheva 
and Gillett 
2011 
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
45 auditors 
56 auditing 
students 
Fixed Asset Task -Decision regarding the 
appropriate treatment for a 
fixed asset expenditure 
Known -Auditors who learn the views of the 
audit partner only after having 
reached their own judgment, report 
that their own initial judgment had 
matched the views of the audit 
partner 
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Study Journal Participants Task Outcome Measure Views Findings 
Peytcheva, 
Wright, and 
Majoor 2014 
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
104 U.S. 
auditors 
48 Dutch 
auditors 
Lease 
Classification 
Task 
-Feelings of process 
accountability 
-Epistemic motivation 
-Demand for evidence 
Not 
Applicable 
- Principle-based standards increase 
auditors' perceptions of 
accountability for the quality of the 
process used to reach a decision 
- Greater process accountability 
results in higher epistemic 
motivation, which is positively 
associated with auditors’ demand for 
diagnostic audit evidence and total 
desired evidence 
Rich 2004 The Accounting 
Review 
56 audit 
managers 
Analytical 
Review 
- Agreement with preparer's 
work 
- Nature and extent of 
elaboration 
- Time estimate for preparer 
to address review notes 
Known - Accountability exacerbates the 
effect of perceived probability of 
preparer error on the extent of critical 
review, which indirectly impacts the 
amount of preparer follow up 
Tan, Jubb, 
and 
Houghton 
1997 
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
70 audit 
supervisors 
and managers 
Inventory 
Obsolescence 
- Risk of inventory 
obsolescence 
- Explanation of decision 
Known - Auditors accountable to partners 
whose views are known make risk 
assessments significantly more in 
line with the partner's views than 
those accountable to a partner with 
unknown views. 
- Auditors accountable to a partner 
with unknown views exert 
significantly more effort than 
auditors accountable to a partner 
whose views are known 
Tan and Kao 
1999 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
105 
Singaporean 
auditors (Big 
6) 
Internal Control 
Task 
- The number of correct 
responses on internal control 
evaluation tasks of high, 
medium and low complexity 
Unknown - Accountability does not improve 
performance on low complexity tasks 
- For medium and high complexity 
tasks, accountability improves 
performance only when auditors 
have the appropriate level of 
knowledge, or the appropriate level 
of knowledge and problem solving 
ability, respectively. 
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Tan, Ng, and 
Mak 2002 
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
105 
Singaporean 
auditors (Big 
6) 
Internal Control 
Task 
- The number of correct 
responses on internal control 
evaluation tasks of high, 
medium, and low 
complexity 
Unknown - Accountability moderates the 
relationship between task complexity 
and performance 
- Performance declines due to high 
task complexity only occur when 
either knowledge is high and 
accountability is low, or 
accountability is high and knowledge 
is low. 
Tan and Tan 
2008 
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
87 
Singaporean 
audit seniors 
Audit Evidence 
Evaluation Task 
- Likelihood assessment 
related to the client’s 
chances of winning a 
significant contract 
Unknown - Find that reviewers and preparers 
are unable to fully remove 
invalidated information from their 
judgments. 
- Accountability moderates the effect 
of the invalidated information for 
reviewers, but not for preparers. 
Turner 2001 Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
89 senior 
auditors and 3 
audit managers 
(Big 5) 
AR 
Collectability 
Review Task 
- Number of evidence items 
examined 
- Time spent reviewing 
evidence selected 
- Search pattern 
Known and 
Unknown 
- Auditors accountable to a partner 
concerned with incurring 
unnecessary cost in evidence 
investigation select fewer items and 
conduct a more client prompted 
evidence search than those 
accountable to a partner with a 
skepticism preference, or a partner 
whose preferences are unknown 
- Accountability preference has no 
impact on time spent reviewing each 
evidence item 
- Provides some evidence that 
accountability can instigate bias 
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Study Journal Participants Task Outcome Measure Views Findings 
Wilks 2002 The Accounting 
Review 
60 audit 
managers  
(Big 5) 
120 senior 
auditors  
(Big 5) 
Reporting -Going concern assessment Known -Compared to auditors who learn of 
the partner’s views after evaluating 
evidence, auditors who learn of their 
partner's views before evaluating 
evidence  
1. evaluate evidence as being more 
consistent with their partner's view, 
and  
2. make going-concern judgments 
that are more in line the partner's 
view 
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STUDY TWO: EGO DEPLETION AND AUDITOR PERFORMANCE: THE 
MODERATING EFFECT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
I. Introduction 
Recent research in auditing has highlighted auditors’ susceptibility to ego depletion 
(Kremin 2014; Bhaskar et al. 2016; Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b).  Ego depletion is an 
exhaustion of mental resources that allows an individual to exercise self-control (Baumeister et 
al. 1998) or engage in active cognitive processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003). Various tasks deplete 
these mental resources affecting an individual’s performance on subsequent depleting tasks.  Ego 
depletion is comparable to the exhaustion one feels from tests of physical strength. Muscles 
weaken when engaging in exercise, diminishing an individual’s ability to perform well on other 
immediate physical tasks (Baumeister et al. 2007).  Psychology researchers have found a variety 
of tasks to be mentally depleting, including those that involve making a choice (e.g. Schmeichel 
et al. 2003; Vohs et al. 2008; Pocheptsova et al. 2009), engaging in intelligent thought, and 
controlling emotions (e.g. Schmeichel et al. 2003).     
A career in auditing demands the execution of a variety of depleting tasks (Kremin 2014; 
Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b). Auditors must often make choices and engage in intelligent 
thought when making audit decisions, such as determining the appropriate risk to assign to a 
particular audit area, deciding which audit procedure to include in the audit program, or 
identifying the proper accounting treatment for a complex accounting issue.  Consequently, the 
depleting nature of such tasks may hinder performance on subsequent tasks and ultimately 
impact audit effectiveness. To the extent that these tasks affect audit quality, identifying factors 
that can mitigate such effects is important.  
59 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether accountability moderates the negative 
effects of ego depletion demonstrated in prior research (Kremin 2014; Bhaskar et al. 2016; 
Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b). The strength model of self-control suggests depleted auditors will 
perform worse than non-depleted auditors on a depleting task (Baumeister et al. 1998). This 
decline in performance is due to diminished mental resources, which are necessary to execute 
such tasks. However, psychology research indicates that individuals can overcome the effects of 
ego depletion and has provided evidence of various mitigating mechanisms (Baumeister et al. 
2007; Baumeister and Vohs 2007).  For example, priming individuals with a belief in unlimited 
willpower (Vohs et al. 2012), engaging in self-affirmation (Schmeichel and Vohs 2009), or 
eliciting positive affect (Tice et al. 2007) have been shown to improve performance in depleted 
individuals. While these mechanisms may translate to the auditing domain if implemented, 
ideally a mechanism inherent to the audit environment may accomplish the same goal. 
Accountability has the potential to be one such mechanism.  
Accountability is defined as the “expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s 
beliefs…” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255) and auditors are simultaneously accountable to a 
variety of parties, such as supervisors, clients, and regulators (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; 
Buchman et al. 1996; Bierstaker and Wright 2001). Accountability theory posits that individuals 
who feel accountable for their decisions will engage “…in an effortful and self-critical search for 
reasons to justify their actions…” when the preference of the party to whom they are accountable 
is unknown (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 263).  Compared to those who do not feel accountable, 
individuals who feel very accountable for their work are expected to use more cognitive effort in 
their decision-making processes, which is triggered by their desire to please key constituencies 
and identify a justifiable response for their decisions (Tetlock 1999). Pleasing important others is 
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expected to sufficiently motivate an individual to overcome the effects of depletion such that a 
depleted auditor’s performance on a depleting task will not significantly differ from the 
performance of a non-depleted auditor.  Prior research in the area finds that accountability is 
capable of moderating personal biases such as the recency effect (Kennedy 1993), the status quo 
heuristic (Messier et al. 2013), and auditors’ tendency to include previously invalidated 
information in their decision processes (Tan and Tan 2008). 
 Two experiments are conducted to examine the moderating effect of accountability on the 
relationship between ego depletion and performance. The initial experiment produced surprising 
results; thus, a follow up experiment was conducted to further investigate the unexpected 
findings. Both experiments are 2 x 2 between-participants experimental designs with the same 
independent and dependent variables.16 The independent variables are depletion (present or 
absent) and accountability (present or absent).17 In both experiments, to manipulate depletion, 
participants in the depleted condition first complete a task designed to induce depletion, and then 
complete the experimental task, an audit risk assessment. In the initial experiment, participants in 
the non-depleted condition begin with the experimental task. In the follow up experiment, the 
depletion task was lengthened for participants in the depleted condition, and participants in the 
non-depleted condition begin with a non-depleting task prior to the experimental task. 
Participants are either accountable or not accountable for their performance on the audit risk 
                                                 
16 Minor modifications were made to the experimental design to help further understand the initial findings. These 
modifications are discussed in more detail in the Experimental Method and Design section. 
17 While accountability is a natural element of the auditing environment, and the complete absence of accountability 
is unattainable, the accountability pressure that auditors feel may vary due to a variety of factors.  For example, 
auditors feel less accountable when reviews are conducted electronically as opposed to face-to-face (Brazel et al. 
2004). Further, accountability pressure varies depending on the accountability mechanism employed. Auditors 
proposed higher materiality thresholds when they only expected their work to be reviewed, compared to auditors 
who were also required to justify their planning materiality decisions and auditors who expected to receive feedback 
on their decisions (DeZoort et al. 2006). In situations where auditors are heavily depleted but performance on a 
depleting task is important, implementing high levels of accountability pressure may be beneficial. 
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assessment exercise. Accountable participants are required to provide their name, provide 
justification for each of their risk assessment decisions, and sign off on their work. They are also 
told that their work will be reviewed. Prior research manipulates accountability in a similar 
manner by requiring participants to provide their names and telling participants that their work 
will be reviewed (e.g. Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Koonce et al. 1995; Peecher 1996) and 
requiring the participants to provide justifications for their decisions (DeZoort et al.2006).  The 
non-accountable participants are required to identify the appropriate risk assessments, but their 
responses are anonymous and no justification or sign-off is required.  The dependent variable of 
interest is the participant’s performance on an audit risk assessment task. 
 Depleted participants are predicted to perform worse on the audit risk assessment 
exercise than non-depleted participants. The audit risk assessment exercise is expected to draw 
on the participants’ self-control resources as they must engage in active cognitive processing to 
determine the appropriate risk assessment given current year information about a hypothetical 
audit client. Depleted participants should perform worse due to the availability of fewer self-
control resources necessary to execute the task. Accountability should moderate this predicted 
discrepancy in performance, as the requirement to justify their decisions and being personally 
linked to their performance should sufficiently motivate depleted participants to overcome the 
effects of depletion. 
Surprisingly, the results from both experiments indicate that depletion improves rather 
than hinders performance when participants are not accountable for their work. Thus, 
accountability is unable to offset the performance decline that depletion was expected to induce. 
The results suggest both accountability and depletion result in improved performance. However, 
the combined effect of both depletion and accountability is not additive in that performance 
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improvements are greater when auditors are both accountable and depleted; accountability and 
depletion appear to be substitutes for improving auditor performance. While contrary to 
expectations, this finding suggests that the strength model of self-control may not be applicable 
to all settings as depleted auditors did not experience the expected performance declines. 
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature. First, it contributes to 
the recent research on ego depletion in auditing.  Prior research suggests that auditors are 
susceptible to depletion (Kremin 2014; Hurley 2015a; Hurley 2015b), particularly those with 
high levels of trait professional skepticism and those who have strong professional identification 
(Bhaskar et al. 2016).  This study provides evidence that ego depletion may not always hinder 
auditor performance but may improve it as well. Second, this study contributes to auditing 
research on accountability that investigates whether accountability moderates certain personal 
biases. Specifically, this study suggests that accountability does not influence the effect that 
depletion has on performance. Instead, it acts as a substitute for depletion due to depletion’s 
ability to improve performance. Lastly, this study contributes to the psychology research on ego 
depletion by demonstrating the ability of ego depletion to improve performance. It also extends 
psychology research that investigates moderators of depletion by considering a moderator not 
previously evaluated in the psychology literature.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the 
background literature and hypotheses development. Section III discusses the experimental 
method and design and section IV provides the experimental results. The conclusion and 
opportunities for future research are provided in section V. 
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II. Background and Hypotheses Development 
Ego Depletion 
The strength model of self-control suggests individuals have a finite number of resources 
available to execute self-control (Baumeister et al. 1998; Muraven and Baumeister 2000). Self-
control is the “capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring them in line with 
standards such as ideals, values, morals and social expectations.…” (Baumeister et al. 2007, 
351).  Many activities such as resisting temptation (Baumeister et al. 1998), controlling emotion 
(Baumeister et al. 1998; Schmeichel et al. 2003; Muraven and Slessareva 2003; Vohs et al. 
2012), or maintaining attention (Schmeichel et al. 2003; Boucher and Kofos 2012; Vohs et al. 
2012) deplete these self-control resources. However, more recently, research has shown that 
certain cognitive tasks such as making choices (Vohs et al. 2008) and executing controlled 
cognitive processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003) draw on these same resources, thus depleting 
individuals engaging in such tasks. Furthermore, psychology research continually supports the 
notion that individuals who utilize their limited resources when executing a depleting task suffer 
performance declines on subsequent tasks that rely on those same self-control resources (e.g. 
Baumeister et al. 1998; Wallace and Baumeister 2002; Schmeichel et al. 2003; Vohs et al. 2008). 
Accounting researchers have recently investigated the impact of depletion in an auditing 
context and have found depletion to have detrimental effects on auditor performance.  Kremin 
(2014) finds that depleted auditors are less likely to correctly identify errors in an analytical 
procedures task when a client is inherently low risk. However, depleted auditors in a high-risk 
setting are able to overcome the effects of depletion and correctly identify more errors in the 
analytical task than those in the low risk setting.  Auditors with high trait skepticism and those 
with strong professional identification are more susceptible to the effects of depletion, 
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highlighting a potential downside of characteristics generally seen as favorable in the audit 
environment (Bhaskar et al. 2016).  Hurley (2015a) also shows that various types of depleting 
tasks result in differing levels of depletion. Specifically, he investigates how two types of 
auditing tasks compare to a depleting task commonly used in psychology. He finds that the two 
auditing tasks result in more depletion than does the depleting psychology task. Auditors also 
exhibit higher levels of depletion during busy season than at other times during the year 
suggesting an accumulation effect, which does not allow self-control resources to be restored 
over a 24-hour time span (Hurley 2015b). 
Consistent with prior accounting research and most relevant to the auditing context is the 
notion that the mental resources utilized for self-control are employed in tasks requiring 
controlled cognitive processing. Related to controlled cognitive processing, Schmeichel et al. 
(2003) state “…using logic to draw conclusions and implications from ideas, extrapolating from 
known facts to make estimates about unknowns, and generating novel ideas may require active 
self-control.” (p. 33).  Schmeichel et al. (2003) suggest that tasks requiring the use of rote 
memory or execution that is relatively automatic would likely not draw on the mental resources 
that are necessary for self-control.  However, those tasks requiring the application of significant 
cognitive effort, such as logical reasoning or problem solving, are expected to draw heavily on 
self-control resources. Individuals must decide how to approach such tasks and consider various 
information cues to reach a conclusion. 
Auditors frequently engage in activities that require significant amounts of cognitive 
effort. These activities include tasks that require auditors to consider various pieces of 
information to formulate a reasonable response. Examples of such tasks include determining the 
appropriate risk to assign to a particular audit area, deciding which audit procedure to include in 
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the audit program, or identifying the proper accounting treatment for a complex accounting 
issue. Less depleting auditing tasks are those that require less cognitive processing such as audit 
testing that requires supporting documents to be reviewed for certain characteristics or the 
agreement of information between multiple documents. Examples of these include control testing 
that requires the auditor to evaluate whether checks over a specified dollar threshold have dual 
signatures, or substantive fixed asset testing that requires the auditor to vouch a sample of fixed 
asset additions to their related invoices. These tasks require the auditor to review supporting 
documentation for certain characteristics but do not demand the level of cognitive effort required 
when employing critical thinking skills. 
Consistent with prior research and the strength model of self-control, depleted auditors 
are predicted to perform worse on a depleting task than auditors who are not depleted. 
H1: Performance on a depleting task will be worse for depleted auditors than for non-
depleted auditors. 
 
Research also finds that the effects of ego depletion can be temporarily overcome if 
individuals are sufficiently motivated.18  Research shows that compensating individuals for 
performance (Muraven and Slessareva 2003) or even having them simply think of money 
(Boucher and Kofos 2012) can offset performance declines caused by depletion. Psychology 
research also suggests depleted individuals will perform at a higher level than they would 
otherwise when they are told that the outcome of the task they are completing will either benefit 
themselves or another individual (Muraven and Slessareva 2003).  Depletion is not only 
overcome through sufficient motivation, but simply altering a person’s mindset or mood can also 
                                                 
18 Motivation is broadly defined as “…any sort of general drive or inclination to do something” (Baumeister and 
Vohs 2007, 2). 
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have an impact.  Priming individuals with belief in unlimited willpower (Vohs et al. 2012), self-
affirmation (Schmeichel and Vohs 2009), and positive affect (Tice et al. 2007) can diminish the 
effects of depletion. While certain moderators identified in the psychology literature may have 
similar effects when implemented in an auditing context, identifying a natural element of the 
auditing environment that can accomplish the same goal is ideal. Accountability may be one 
such element. 
 Accountability is motivating due to the desire for individuals to reach a defensible 
conclusion that will please important others. Accountability to parties whose preferences are 
unknown will result in more cognitively complex decision making processes as individuals will 
attempt to consider various perspectives when making their decision and formulate responses to 
any objections that evaluative others might raise (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).  This response stems 
from a core assumption of accountability theory—that individuals seek social approval and 
therefore strive to reach decisions that are justifiable and will be viewed favorably by key parties 
(Tetlock 1999). 
In an auditing context, accountability is expected to motivate depleted auditors to achieve 
performance levels more consistent with their non-depleted counterparts.  Accountability is 
particularly important in the audit environment, as auditors manage multiple accountability 
relationships with various parties (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996; 
Bierstaker and Wright 2001). When one of these parties determines that the auditor’s 
performance is unsatisfactory, the auditor may incur negative consequences. For example, a 
supervisor may react to unsatisfactory performance by writing a poor performance review, or a 
client may request the auditor be removed from the engagement.  The desire to please these key 
parties and avoid such negative consequences is expected to incentivize auditors to overcome the 
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effects of depletion and perform at a level higher than those who are depleted but not 
accountable for performance.  
 Prior research in accounting finds that accountability influences auditor decision-making. 
For example, auditors accountable for their decisions have greater consensus in their risk 
assessments related to inventory obsolescence. They are also more aware of their decision-
making process indicating increased cognitive effort (Johnson and Kaplan 1991). Auditors also 
alter their testing strategy in an audit planning task when they expect their work to be reviewed 
and they do not know the preferences of their reviewer, compared to auditors who do not 
anticipate a review (Asare et al. 2000). 19 
Given that accountability influences how individuals make decisions by inducing a more 
effortful decision process, accountability is expected to motivate depleted auditors to overcome 
the effects of depletion and perform at a level comparable to non-depleted auditors and perform 
at a level substantially better than depleted auditors who are not accountable. 
H2: Accountability moderates the effect of ego depletion on performance such that 
auditors who are depleted and not accountable for their work will perform poorer than 
those who are depleted and accountable and those who are not depleted.  
III. Experimental Method and Design 
Design and Procedure 
The initial experiment involves a 2 x 2 between-participants design that investigates the 
potential moderating effect of accountability on ego depletion. Depletion and accountability are 
                                                 
19 No main effect for accountability is hypothesized as prior literature that has shown the positive effects of 
accountability when accountable to parties with unknown preferences (e.g. Asare et al. 2000, DeZoort et al. 2006; 
Tan and Kao 1999). 
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the independent variables, both of which are manipulated as present or absent. The dependent 
variable is participants’ performance on an audit risk assessment exercise. 
Participants in the depletion condition received an initial depleting task adapted from the 
depletion manipulation task used by Kremin (2014).  The task required participants to count the 
number of times “e” appeared in a passage that they were provided.  They then received a second 
passage and counted only those “e”s that were not followed by a vowel or a vowel was not “one 
letter removed from the ‘e’ in either direction.” (Kremin 2014, 44). This required the use of self-
control resources to override the initial rule of counting all “e”s, thus depleting the participants’ 
self-control resources.  Similar tasks are used in psychology research (e.g. Tice et al. 2007) and a 
recent meta-analysis found this type of task to be most effective at inducing depletion (Hagger et 
al. 2010).20 Participants in the non-depleted condition received the depleting task subsequent to 
the audit task in order to maintain consistent task duration across treatments. 
Participants also completed an audit task for which they were either accountable or not. 
The accountability manipulation applied only to the audit task; and, for those participants in the 
depletion condition, the information pertaining to the accountability manipulation was provided 
to participants after the e-counting task. The audit task consisted of an audit risk assessment 
activity adopted from Bhaskar et al. (2016).  Participants made a series of risk assessments for a 
hypothetical audit client.  They were given current year client information relevant to the risk 
assessments being made, as well as the prior year risk assessments and justifications.  
Participants utilized the current year client information to assess client risk on a scale of 1 to 7 
                                                 
20 In studies related to ego depletion, the presence of depletion is often tested utilizing performance on subsequent 
tasks (e.g. Schmeichel and Vohs 2009, Moller et al. 2006; Hurley 2015a). In this experimental setting, an additional 
task designed to measure depletion would further deplete the participants, thus influencing their performance on the 
audit risk assessment exercise. As such, the performance on the audit risk assessment exercise is expected to be 
indicative of depletion. There are no previously validated scales specifically designed to measure depletion. 
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across a variety of factors. In the accountability condition, participants were required to provide 
their name, justifications for their risk assessment decisions, and sign off on their work. 
Furthermore, they were told their work would be reviewed. Accounting research on 
accountability often manipulates accountability by asking participants to provide their names and 
informing them that their work will be reviewed (Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Koonce et al. 
1995; Peecher 1996) and requiring them to provide justifications for their decisions (DeZoort et 
al. 2006). Participants who were not accountable for their work on the audit risk assessment task 
were told their responses would be reviewed but that the responses would not be associated with 
their name, and they were not required to justify their decision or sign off on their work.  Figure 
2 provides an example of the risk assessment exercise for the accountable condition. The non-
accountable condition contained the same information except it excludes the two far right 
columns that require the justification and sign off. 
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Figure 2: Risk Assessment Example- Accountable Condition 
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Dependent Variables 
Performance is assessed as the number of correct responses identified by each participant 
on the audit risk assessment exercise. Participants are provided prior year risk assessments and 
must determine whether the current year risk has increased or decreased from prior year, or 
stayed the same based on the current year company information they are provided. A response is 
deemed to be correct when the participant identifies the appropriate directional change or 
appropriately suggests no change from prior year is necessary. Consistent with Bhaskar et al. 
(2016), each correct response receives one point and an incorrect response receives zero points. 
Participants received an aggregate score of all correct answers ranging from 0 to 8.21  
Control Variables 
Participants also completed a post experimental questionnaire to assess their trait self-
control (Tangney et al. 2004), perception of depletion (Clarkson et al. 2010), and level of trait 
skepticism (Hurtt 2010). These variables are included as potential control variables as they are 
expected to impact participants’ performance on an audit risk assessment exercise regardless of 
the participants’ depletion and accountability conditions. Lastly, participants responded to 
demographic questions about their gender, age, and professional work experience. 
                                                 
21 The risk assessment exercise was shortened from 15 risk assessments to 10 risk assessments due to time 
constraints. Furthermore, two risk assessments were eliminated from analysis. One was removed because the 
appropriate directional change for the assessment was unclear.  The last risk assessment was removed from analysis 
because over half of the participants in all conditions responded incorrectly. Including this final risk assessment in 
the analysis does not quantitatively alter the results. 
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Participants 
Participants were undergraduate and graduate accounting students.  One hundred and 
twenty-seven participants were recruited from four undergraduate auditing classes and one 
graduate auditing class. Each student was compensated $10 for their time.22 The experiment was 
administered in the University’s behavioral lab via Qualtrics. Participants signed up for sessions 
in the lab when they were recruited, and they were randomly assigned to one of four conditions 
during their session. As the experiment was expected to take 45 minutes of the students’ time, 
the behavioral lab was utilized to provide a controlled setting with minimal distractions that 
allowed participants to apply an appropriate level of focus.  
Students are deemed to be appropriate participants for this task, as they are expected to be 
as susceptible to the effects of ego depletion as practicing auditors. Libby et al. (2002) suggest 
that student participants are appropriate in studies investigating individuals’ cognitive abilities. 
Students are expected to be able to complete the audit risk assessment task given their enrollment 
in an auditing course. Furthermore, Bhaskar et al. (2016) developed the risk assessment exercise 
with the assistance of firm personnel who considered the exercise to be consistent with the type 
of task a staff level auditor would perform. They also successfully utilized this risk assessment 
exercise with student participants.  
While the independent variables were manipulated based on what the participants were 
required to do, as opposed to what they read, it was important that the participants paid 
appropriate attention to the tasks at hand. Accountable participants were required to provide 
justifications for their risk assessments while non-accountable participants were not.  As such, 
                                                 
22  All but three students also received extra credit from their professors for participating, as one professor did not 
offer extra credit to students who participated. 
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participants were asked if they were “…required to provide an explanation for… [the] current 
year risk assessment and sign off on [the] assessment?” In total, five participants in the non-
accountable group failed the manipulation check and were removed from the analysis. 
Additionally, three participants in the accountable condition did not provide their full name as 
requested, but instead provided their initials. As such, they were also removed due to concern 
that they would not have the same feeling of accountability as those individuals who provided 
their full names. 
Depleted participants were required to complete an “e” counting task prior to completing 
the risk assessment exercise. It is important that the participants paid sufficient attention to this 
task. Observations were removed for participants who were two standard deviations removed 
from the mean number of “e”s identified on the second portion of the “e” task and two standard 
deviations removed from the mean time taken on the second portion of the “e” task.23 
Participants were eliminated based on both number identified and time in an attempt to exclude 
those individuals who may not have taken the task seriously. Specifically, the criteria attempted 
to capture those individuals who counted all “e”s rather than following the specific rule provided 
on the second passage, those who simply input a number so they could proceed without 
appropriately completing the task, those who took so little time it is questionable whether they 
took the task seriously, and those took so much time there is concern they may have been 
distracted from the task at hand. Four additional observations were removed due to the “e” task.  
One hundred fifteen responses were left after removing these twelve responses.  Due to the 
unequal cell size, and failing the assumption of homogeneity of variances (p = 0.005), an 
                                                 
23 This analysis focused on the second portion of the “e” task, as this was the most cognitively taxing portion.   
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additional 11 observations were randomly removed to equalize cell sizes, leaving a total of 104 
observations for hypotheses testing.  
 Participants’ demographic information is presented in Table 2.24 Approximately 55 
percent of the participants included in the analysis were male, while approximately 45 percent 
were female. Seventy-seven percent of participants were between the ages of 21 and 25 and 
approximately 21 percent had previous auditing experience.  
Table 2: Initial Experiment-Demographic Profile of Participants 
   
(n = 104) 
   
   
   n (%) b  
 Age:    
 18-20  2 (1.9)  
 21-25  80 (76.9)  
 26-30  15 (14.4)  
 31-35  4 (3.9)  
 36-40  --  
 40+  2 (1.9)  
 Prefer not to answer  1 (1.0)  
     
 Gender:    
 Male  57 (54.8)  
 Female  47 (45.2)  
     
 Auditing Work Experience:    
 Yes  22 (21.2)  
  No  82 (78.8)  
     
 Type of Auditing Experience:    
 Internal Audit  1 (4.5)  
 External Audit  20 (91.0)  
 Both  1 (4.5)  
     
 Years of Auditing Experience:    
 <1  20 (91.0)  
 1-2  1 (4.5)  
 3-4  1 (4.5)  
 5+  --  
     
   
b 
Provides the demographic information for the participants that were used in the data analysis.
 
   
                                                 
24 Demographic variables were evaluated for differences across conditions and no differences were identified. 
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IV. Results 
Test of Hypotheses 
 H1 predicts that performance on a depleting task will be worse for depleted auditors than 
for non-depleted auditors.  Figure 3 Panel A provides a graph of the predicted results and Panel 
B provides a graph of the actual results. 
 
Panel A: Predicted Result 
 
Panel B: Actual Results 
 
Figure 3: Initial Experiment-Predicted and Actual Results for Number of Correct Directional 
Changes 
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Performance is assessed by counting the total number of correct directional changes 
identified by each participant. For the total number of correct directional responses, I run an 
ANCOVA and control for trait professional skepticism and trait self-control.25 Table 3 Panel A 
provides descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics indicate that individuals in the not 
depleted/accountable condition identify the most correct responses (mean = 6.54). Overall, the 
accountable participants (mean = 6.33) appear to perform better than those who are not 
accountable (mean = 5.50), and depleted participants (mean = 6.08) appear to perform better than 
those who are not depleted (mean = 5.75). 
  
                                                 
25 Covariates were evaluated by regressing all potential control variables on the dependent variable of interest and 
running an ANCOVA that included all possible control variables. Trait skepticism and trait self-control were the 
only potential control variables that were significant (p ≤.05) or marginally significant (p ≤.10) in one or both 
models.  
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Table 3: Initial Experiment- Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses- Correct Directional 
Change of Risk Assessment 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Number of Correct Directional Changes  Mean 
[Standard Deviation] 
 
 Number of Correct Directional Changes  
Source of Variation  Accountable  Not Accountable   
       
Depleted  6.12  6.04 6.08  
  [1.80]  [2.16] [1.97]  
  n =26  n =26 n =52  
       
Not Depleted  6.54  4.96 5.75  
  [1.33]  [2.58] [2.19]  
  n =26  n =26 n= 52  
       
  6.33  5.50   
  [1.58]  [2.42]   
  n =52  n =52   
      
Panel B: ANCOVA Results 
 
Source of Variation  df  MSE  F-statistic  p-value  
          
Depletion a  1  4.724  1.220  0.272  
Accountability a  1  12.711  3.283  0.073  
Depletion X Accountability  1  12.890  3.329  0.071  
Trait Self-Control  1  17.277  4.462  0.037  
Professional Skepticism  1  23.892  6.171  0.015  
Error  98  3.872      
       
Panel C: Planned Comparison Tests a 
 
 T-statistic  p-value b  
     
H1: Depleted < Not Depleted (+1,-1) -1.090  0.139  
H2: Depleted/Not Accountable < Depleted/Accountable, 
Not Depleted/Not Accountable, Not Depleted/Accountable 
(-3,+1,+1,+1) -.651  0.258  
      
Panel D: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects a 
       
Source of Variation  df  F-statistic  p-value  
        
Effects of Depletion given no Accountability  1  4.299  0.041  
Effects of Depletion given Accountability  1  .253  0.616  
Effects of Accountability given no Depletion  1  6.566  0.012  
Effects of Accountability given Depletion  1  .000  0.990  
 
a 
Results include the covariates of trait professional skepticism and trait self-control   
b Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent 
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The results of the ANCOVA are provided in Table 3 Panel B. Although not 
hypothesized, the results suggest there is a main effect for accountability. This finding supports 
prior research that also finds accountability to improve performance (e.g. Asare et al. 2000; Tan 
and Kao 1999). H1 predicts that the depleted participants will perform worse on the risk 
assessment exercise than the non-depleted participants. In the ANCOVA, the main effect for 
depletion is not significant (p = 0.272, two-tailed). However, due to the directional nature of the 
hypothesis, a planned comparison is conducted. This analysis also finds an insignificant main 
effect for depletion (p = 0.139, one-tailed).26 Participants in the depleted and non-depleted 
groups did not identify a significantly different number of correct directional changes on the risk 
assessment exercise. As such, H1 is not supported.  
Table 3 Panel C presents the result of a planned comparison that tests the hypothesized 
interaction (H2). The finding indicates that the depleted/non-accountable condition does not 
perform significantly worse than the other three conditions (p = 0.258, one-tailed). As such, H2 
is not supported. However, due to the marginally significant interaction identified in the 
ANCOVA (p = 0.071, two-tailed), the simple effects are analyzed to investigate the nature of the 
interaction. 
The simple effects analysis is presented in Table 3 Panel D. The results suggest that 
accountability affects performance when participants are not depleted (p = 0.012, two-tailed), but 
accountability does not affect performance when they are depleted (p = 0.990, two-tailed). 
                                                 
26 The bottom two-thirds of participants who identified the lowest number of “e”s on the depleting portion of the e-
task were analyzed separately. This was done try and capture a subset of participants who may be more depleted 
than the others. The top one-third of participants were excluded, as those who input a higher number may have tried 
to count all “e”s and ignored the specific rule associated with the second portion of the e-task. The results of the 
analysis with the bottom two-thirds of participants present a pattern consistent with the reported findings. 
Furthermore, the results reveal significant main effects for depletion.  
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Participants who are not depleted identify significantly more correct directional changes when 
they are accountable than when they are not. The positive effect of accountability on 
performance is consistent with prior accounting literature that finds accountability to parties with 
unknown views positively influences auditor decision-making (e.g. Ashton 1990; Tan and Kao 
1999). Furthermore, depletion caused a significant difference in the number of correct directional 
changes participants identified when the participants were not accountable for their work (p = 
0.041, two-tailed). Depleted participants who were not accountable identified significantly more 
correct directional changes than non-depleted participants who were not accountable.  
Overall, the findings do not provide support for H1 and H2. While the ANCOVA 
indicates a marginally significant interaction, the interaction is not in the manner expected. 
Surprisingly, the simple effect analysis reveals that participants’ who were depleted showed an 
improvement, rather than decline, in their performance. The nature of the interaction indicates 
that both accountability and depletion improve performance. However, the effect of both 
treatments is not additive in that performance is significantly better when both depletion and 
accountability are present. Rather, depletion and accountability appear to act as substitutes. The 
presence of either accountability or depletion improves performance to a similar extent. 
Experimental Modifications and Additional Analysis 
 Recent research has questioned whether the phenomenon of ego depletion is a reality. A 
meta-analysis of prior research was conducted and ultimately found little evidence that ego 
depletion exists (Carter et al. 2015). Carter et al. (2015) utilize new statistical procedures and 
address limitations of a 2010 meta-analysis of ego depletion research (Hagger et al. 2010); they 
challenge years of research on the strength model of ego depletion. As a result, Hagger and 
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Chatzisarantis (2016) conduct a replication study utilizing experimental materials adopted from 
Sripada et al. (2014). The findings of this replication study also provide little evidence of the ego 
depletion effect. 
Due to the recent research questioning the strength model of ego depletion (e.g. Carter et 
al. 2015; Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2016) and the unexpected experimental results reported 
above, an additional experiment was conducted to refine some experimental design choices to 
see if the positive effect of depletion continues to hold. Two main changes were made. First, the 
depletion task was lengthened. Initially, this task was shortened from the version used by Kremin 
(2014) due to time constraints. As Kremin (2014) found the e-task to be depleting, use of the 
full-length version alleviates concern that the unexpected findings are attributable to the 
shortened task. Second, the non-depleted group was also provided a version of the e-counting 
task that was not expected to cause depletion. In the initial experiment, the non-depleted group 
was not provided with an e-counting task, and instead started with the risk assessment exercise 
used for the dependent variable. Providing the non-depleted group with a similar task ensures 
that the improved performance seen in the depleted participants is not due to the mere presence 
of an initial task, but rather, due to the nature of the task provided. The risk assessment task and 
the way in which the dependent variable is calculated do not differ from the initial experiment. 
Participants were recruited from three undergraduate auditing courses, and were provided extra 
credit for their participation. Consistent with the prior experiment, observations were eliminated 
for participants who failed the manipulation check regarding the requirement for justification (1 
participant), and outliers associated with the number of “e”s identified on the second portion of 
the depleting e-counting task (2 participants) and the amount of time taken on the second portion 
of the depleting e-counting task (2 participants). This reduced the sample from 67 observation to 
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a final sample of 62 observations. Demographic information associated with the sample is 
provided in Table 4. Most participants were between the ages of 21 and 25 (61.2%), with slightly 
more males (53.2%) than females (46.8%) participating in this study. Only 9.6% of the 
participants had any auditing work experience.   
Table 4: Follow Up Experiment- Demographic Profile of Participants 
   
 (n = 62) 
   
   
   n (%) b  
 Age:    
 18-20  2 (3.2)  
 21-25  28 (61.3)  
 26-30  6 (9.7)  
 31-35  3 (4.8)  
 36-40  5 (8.1)  
 40+  6 (9.7)  
 Prefer not to answer  2 (3.2)  
     
 Gender:    
 Male  33 (53.2)  
 Female  29 (46.8)  
     
 Auditing Work Experience:    
 Yes  6 (9.7)  
  No  56 (90.3)  
     
 Type of Auditing Experience:    
 Internal Audit  1 (16.7)  
 External Audit  5 (83.3)  
 Both  --  
     
 Years of Auditing Experience:    
 <1  6 (9.7)  
 1-2  --  
 3-4  --  
 5+  --  
     
   
b 
Provides the demographic information for the participants that were used in the data analysis.
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The primary dependent variable for this experiment is the number of correct directional 
responses identified by each participant on the audit risk assessment exercise. This number could 
range from 0-8. Graphical depictions of the predicted and actual results are provided in Figure 4 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Table 5 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for each 
condition, while Panel B provide the ANCOVA results.27 The ANCOVA model controls for trait 
self-control. While trait skepticism and perception of depletion were also evaluated as potential 
covariates, they did not significantly impact the dependent variable. 
  
                                                 
27 Although the Levene’s test associated with the ANCOVA is significant at .032, Field (2009) advises also 
evaluating the Hartley’s Fmax as he suggests “Levene’s test is not necessarily the best way to judge whether variances 
are unequal enough to cause problems” (p. 405). Based on this test, I find that the difference in variance is not cause 
for concern. 
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Panel A: Predicted Result 
 
Panel B: Actual Results 
 
 
Figure 4: Follow Up Experiment- Predicted and Actual Results for Number of Correct 
Directional Changes 
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Table 5: Follow Up Experiment- Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses- Correct 
Directional Change of Risk Assessment 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Number of Correct Directional Changes - Mean 
[Standard Deviation] 
 
 Number of Correct Directional Changes  
Source of Variation  Accountable  Not Accountable   
       
Depleted  5.814  5.857 5.833  
  [1.424]  [2.214] [1.802]  
  n=16  n=14 n=30  
       
Not Depleted  5.941  4.933 5.469  
  [1.249]  [2.120] [1.759]  
  n=17  n=15 n=32  
       
  5.879  5.379   
  [1.317]  [2.178]   
  n=33  n=29   
      
Panel B: ANCOVA Results 
 
Source of Variation  df  MSE  F-statistic  p-value  
          
Depletion a  1  4.955  1.725  0.194  
Accountability a  1  2.937  1.023  0.316  
Depletion X Accountability  1  2.609  .908  0.345  
Trait Self-Control  1  18.305  6.373  0.014  
Error  57  2.872      
       
Panel C: Planned Comparison Test a 
       
Source of Variation    T-statistic  p-valueb  
        
H1: Depleted < Not Depleted (+1,-1)  1.28  0.103  
H2: Depleted/Not Accountable < Depleted/Accountable, 
Not Depleted/Not Accountable, Not Depleted/Accountable 
(-3,+1,+1,+1)  -.670  0.253  
        
No Depletion/No Accountability< No 
Depletion/Accountability   1.378  0.087  
No Depletion/No Accountability< Depletion/No 
Accountability   1.605  0.057  
 
a 
Results include the covariates of trait self-control 
b 
Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent   
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The results of the follow up experiment suggest that the main effect for depletion is not 
significant (p = 0.194, two-tailed) and there is no significant interaction (p = 0.345, two-tailed). 
However, a planned comparison is conducted to test the directional nature the hypothesis related 
to the main effect for depletion. The depleted condition is assigned a contrast weight of +1, and 
the non-depleted condition is assigned a contrast weight of -1. The hypothesized interaction is 
also analyzed using a planned comparison. The depleted/non-accountable condition is given a 
contrast weight of -3, while all other conditions are given a contrast weight of +1. The results of 
the planned comparisons are presented in Table 5 Panel C. The findings suggest there is no 
significant main effect for depletion (p = 0.103, one-tailed), and no significant interaction (p = 
0.253, one-tailed). These findings are consistent with the results of the initial experiment. 
Given the results of the prior experiment and the few studies that suggest depletion may 
improve performance on subsequent tasks (Converse and DeShon 2009; DeWitte et al. 2009), I 
conduct two additional planned comparison tests to evaluate whether the significant simple 
effects identified in the prior experiment are present in the current data. The first test evaluates 
whether depletion improves performance given no accountability, and the second investigates 
whether accountability improves performance when depletion is not present. The results of these 
planned comparisons are also provided in Table 5, Panel C. The results indicate a marginally 
significant difference in performance for those individuals who are depleted and those who are 
not, provided no accountability pressure (p = 0.087, one-tailed). Depleted individuals performed 
better than those who were not depleted. Furthermore, accountability improved the performance 
of individuals who were not depleted, as there was a marginally significant difference in 
performance between non-depleted participants who were accountable and non-depleted 
participants who were not accountable (p = 0.057, one-tailed). Overall, the results from the 
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second experiment support the results from the first experiment and provide evidence that 
depletion may improve performance when completing an auditing task. 
V. Conclusion and Opportunities for Future Research 
The results of this study suggest that depletion and accountability do not interact in the 
expected manner. Absent accountability, depletion was found to improve, rather than hinder 
performance. Given this finding, it is not possible to evaluate whether accountability is able to 
offset performance declines associated with depletion. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that 
both accountability and depletion improve performance. The combined effect of depletion and 
accountability, however, do not improve performance beyond the performance of participants 
who were only accountable and those who were only depleted. This indicates that depletion and 
accountability act as substitutes for improving performance. 
These findings are counter to the significant stream of research on the strength model of 
self-control (e.g. Baumeister et al. 1998, Baumeister et al. 2007), as well as the current 
accounting literature on ego depletion.  Current research in accounting provides some evidence 
that depletion may hinder subsequent performance. Kremin (2014) finds that depletion hinders 
auditors’ abilities to properly identify an error in an analytical procedure, but only when client 
risk is low. Bhaskar et al. (2016) performed two experiments to investigate the interactive effect 
of trait skepticism and depletion and professional identity and depletion. In one experiment, they 
find that depletion does hinder performance when depletion was induced by requiring 
participants to resist temptation.28  
                                                 
28 It should be noted, however, that Bhaskar et al. (2016) conduct another experiment where they use a depleting 
task that involves switching mindsets, but it is not a task previously used in the psychology literature. In this 
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As previously discussed, recent research has challenged the strength model of ego 
depletion, with some research suggesting that there are circumstances under which exertion of 
self-control resources improves performance, which would be consistent with the results of this 
study (Converse and DeShon 2009; DeWitte et al. 2009).  Researchers propose alternative 
theories that may help to explain the performance improvement experienced by depleted 
individuals.  
DeWitte et al. (2009) draw on cognitive control theory to suggest that when consecutive 
tasks of self-control utilize similar self-control processes, performance improves on the second 
self-control task. Converse and DeShon (2009) also indicate that significant exertion of self-
control resources may improve performance on subsequent tasks. They adhere to the self-
adaptation view of self-control and speculate that the improved performance is attributable to 
one’s ability to adapt to the level of self-control that is required of them. However, in their 
experiments, they find this adaptation generally occurs over multiple consecutive tasks requiring 
self-control, as opposed to just one initial self-control task.  
 There a couple of additional plausible explanations for the unexpected results in this 
study. The initial depletion task may have engaged participants’ system two by requiring 
participants to utilize more effortful cognitive processing. The use of this system then carried 
over to the risk assessment exercise, resulting in more effortful cognitive processing on the 
second task and thus improved performance. Those individuals who received either no initial 
task, or received the non-depleting e-counting task, likely relied on their default system one to 
complete the risk assessment exercise. This system, however, tends to be cognitively lazy and 
                                                 
experiment, they found no main effect for depletion. Interestingly, they find some evidence that the depleting task 
did improve performance for participants with low levels of professional identity. 
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operates more automatically, often utilizing heuristics in decision making. As such, participants 
utilizing system one exerted less cognitive effort on the risk assessment exercise resulting in 
poorer performance.   
Another possible explanation is that the depleted participants may have perceived the risk 
assessment exercise to be more enjoyable relative to the monotonous, yet challenging nature of 
the depletion task. Given that participants are accounting students, it is reasonable to assume they 
may have enjoyed the risk assessment exercise. While the non-depleted participants may have 
also found the risk assessment task to be enjoyable, their frame of reference would be different. 
They may not appreciate the risk assessment exercise to the same extent as the depleted 
participants. Although no definitive conclusion can be made as to whether these proposed 
explanations can be attributed to the unexpected findings in this study, additional research should 
continue to investigate why depletion sometimes helps rather than hinders performance. 
This study contributes to the literature on ego depletion in that it helps to extend our 
understanding of ego depletion in an auditing context. It provides evidence that depletion may 
improve performance in certain circumstances. The auditing domain is unique such that certain 
cognitive phenomenon may not translate to an audit setting, and it is important to explore where 
these differences occur. Furthermore, this study also adds to the conflicting psychology literature 
on ego depletion by highlighting a scenario where the strength model of self-control does not 
hold true. It provides further evidence that the strength model of self-control does not apply to all 
situations, thus future research should continue to refine the strength model of self-control and 
identify conditions to which the theory is applicable. Lastly, this study contributes to the 
literature on accountability by investigating the ability of accountability to moderate another 
cognitive phenomenon, ego depletion.  
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 As with any study, there are limitations that must be discussed. The use of an e-counting 
task to induce depletion is one of a variety of exercises expected to be depleting. As such, it is 
possible that the results may differ when utilizing an alternative depleting task. Furthermore, ego 
depletion research commonly uses the sequential task setting, as was done in this study. We are 
unable to definitively state whether the depleting task caused depletion, but we infer the 
depletion due to the change in performance on the secondary task; in this instance, the risk 
assessment exercise. Furthermore, the risk assessment exercise was also shortened from the 
version utilized by Bhaskar et al. (2016). This shortened version of the risk assessment exercise 
may not have required the use of enough self-control resources such that performance declines 
would be evident in those participants with limited self-control resources. It is possible the 
results would differ if participants were provided the full risk assessment exercise. Lastly, the use 
of students as participants was deemed appropriate due to the cognitive phenomenon being 
investigated. However, it is unknown whether auditors would respond in the same manner as 
auditing students.  
Although the findings of this study are counter to the strength model of self-control, 
future research should investigate the circumstances under which individuals’ performance is 
improved or hindered by depleting self-control resources. Researchers should consider 
alternative theories regarding self-control to gain a more complete perspective on how self-
control impacts performance in an audit context. Future research should also investigate the 
persistence of depletion and determine how long the positive or negative effects of depletion may 
impact performance. Currently, very little is known about how long the benefits or consequences 
of depletion may last.  
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STUDY THREE: AUDITOR JUDGMENT IN A MULTIPLE 
ACCOUNTABILITY SETTING: THE EFFECTS OF POWER LEVEL AND 
JUSTIFICATION TIMING 
I. Introduction 
Accountability is a key element of the auditing profession and reflects an auditor’s 
responsibility to justify their decisions to a number of important parties, including various firm 
members, client contacts, regulatory bodies, and financial statement users (e.g. Gibbins and 
Newton 1994; Bierstaker and Wright 2001; Rich 2004; Bagley 2010).  Oftentimes auditors must 
manage multiple accountability relationships concurrently and consider the preferences of 
multiple parties when making decisions.  This can be particularly challenging when the parties’ 
preferences conflict. Elements of these conflicting accountability relationships can differ, which 
may impact auditors’ decision-making processes. Specifically, the parties may have different 
power levels, reflected in their differing abilities to impose consequences upon the auditor for 
unsatisfactory performance (Tetlock 1999).  In an auditing context, justification timing may also 
vary. Justification timing refers to the point at which the auditor must justify their decision 
relative to when the decision was made.  For example, supervisory review of audit workpapers 
may occur immediately upon completion of section work or be delayed a few weeks, depending 
on the audit (Lambert and Agoglia 2011). Thus, the point at which the auditor must justify their 
decision as part of the review process varies. Bazerman et al. (2002) allude to the potential 
impact of justification timing on auditor decision making, by stating, “People tend to be far more 
responsive to immediate consequences than delayed ones...”  (p. 100). 
This study aims to advance our understanding of auditor decision making in a multiple 
accountability setting.  Specifically, it investigates how the power difference between conflicting 
parties and the timing of justification influence auditor decision making in a client/superior 
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accountability setting.  Understanding the effect of these factors is particularly important due to 
their implications for audit quality.  Professional standards do not suggest auditor objectivity 
should be influenced by external factors associated with the multiple accountability relationships 
that auditors manage (PCAOB 2015).  If characteristics inherent to certain accountability 
relationships negatively impact auditor judgments, firms and other professional organizations 
may want to consider factors that either mitigate or eliminate their effects.   
Accountability to one’s superior and the client contact represents a common 
accountability relationship that auditors must manage on a day-to-day basis.29  Furthermore, the 
preferences of these two parties are likely to conflict at times. The audit review process 
facilitates accountability to one’s superior, as the auditor must respond to comments received 
regarding their work and address any questions from their superior.  Auditors experience 
accountability to the client through the day-to-day interaction and dialogue that occurs when 
completing section work.  Auditors often request additional audit evidence or ask questions 
regarding their assigned tasks (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). As part of this process, the auditor 
must justify to the client why the additional requests are necessary, or explain their conclusions 
regarding the appropriateness of a particular account balance or the effectiveness of an internal 
control. 
Accountability theory and construal level theory (CLT) establish expectations regarding 
the impact of power difference and justification timing, respectively.  Accountability theory 
suggests that when there is a large power differential between two conflicting parties, the 
accountable party will make decisions more in line with the preferences of the more powerful 
                                                 
29 Superior refers to the auditor’s immediate supervisor. For a senior auditor, this is generally the manager on 
the engagement. 
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party (Tetlock 1999).  This is due to the ability of the more powerful party to impose 
consequences for unsatisfactory performance that are more severe than the consequences 
imposed by the less powerful party. However, when the power differential is small (i.e. there is 
little difference between power levels) and the auditor faces significant consequences from either 
party, auditors will engage in more cognitively, complex information processing to reach their 
decisions (Tetlock 1999). This more effortful decision-making process will result in a decision 
that will differ significantly from the decision made when the auditor is accountable to parties 
with a large power differential. This cognitively complex information processing allows 
individuals to make decisions that they can defend when required to justify their conclusions to 
parties who may not agree.  
Justification timing is also expected to influence auditor decision making.  Accountability 
theory proposes how auditors will react in a variety of accountability settings; however, it does 
not address how variances in justification timing may impact individuals’ decisions. CLT 
suggests that auditors think about events in the near future differently than they think about 
events in the distant future (Liberman and Trope 1998).  Events in the near future are assessed 
using low-level construals, meaning the auditor will consider detailed, specific aspects of an 
event. Distant events, on the other hand, evoke high level construals, or broader, more general 
ideas and thoughts. In a decision justification setting, auditors are expected to have an increased 
focus on the potential reaction of the evaluative party (a low-level construal) when the event is 
near versus distant, thus causing auditors to align their decision more closely with the 
preferences of the temporally proximate party.   
This study employs a 2x2 between-participants experimental design to investigate the 
effects of power level difference (i.e. power differential) and justification timing. Power 
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differential is manipulated as large vs. small by varying the client contact’s position as either a 
staff accountant or the CFO, respectively, while keeping the superior, the audit manager, the 
same in both conditions.  Justification timing is manipulated at two levels by varying whether the 
participant must first justify their decision to their superior or to the client. 
Overall, the results of this study indicate that the level of power differential between 
conflicting accountability sources influences auditors’ decisions. A large power differential 
between parties results in decisions that align more closely with the superior’s preference than 
does a small power differential. Furthermore, accountability to conflicting sources with a small 
power differential results in a more integratively complex decision-making process. Justification 
timing also affected auditors’ decisions, but not in a manner consistent with CLT. The pattern of 
means indicates that auditors’ decisions more closely align with the preferences of the last party 
to whom they justify their decision, rather than the first. 
This study contributes to the literature on accountability by furthering our understanding 
of how two characteristics (power level and justification timing) inherent in conflicting 
accountability relationships influence decision making.  While the literature has frequently 
acknowledged that multiple accountability pressures are a reality in the audit profession, limited 
research has examined auditors’ decisions when accountable to multiple sources with differing 
preferences (Gramling 1999; Bierstaker and Wright 2001). This study is the first to consider how 
a perceived power difference between parties impacts decision making in a multiple 
accountability setting.   
Theoretically, this research has broader implications and helps us understand how the 
power difference and justification timing between two conflicting parties influences decision 
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making in a professional context. These findings may generalize to a variety of accountability 
relationships in the auditing environment.  
Practically, this research helps to inform audit firms, professional organizations, and 
regulatory bodies how two important elements of any multiple accountability relationship 
influence auditor decision making.  Due to the influence of a power differential between parties, 
audit firms should consider the multiple accountability relationships that auditors manage and the 
impact that these relationships have on individual auditors’ decisions making processes. 
Knowledge on this topic may help firms identify factors that can mitigate the undue influence of 
a power difference between parties. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  The next section discusses the theory and hypotheses 
development. Section III discusses the experimental method and design.  Lastly, section IV 
provides the results, and section V discusses the conclusion and opportunities for future research. 
II. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
Accountability  
Prior research on accountability in auditing demonstrates the tendency of auditors to 
make decisions in line with the party to whom they are accountable, when that party’s preference 
is known (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996; Peecher 1996; Tan et. al. 1997; 
Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Turner 2001).  Research also recognizes that auditors manage 
multiple accountability relationships, including the accountability relationships to one’s superior 
and to the client (e.g. Gibbins and Newton 1994; Buchman et al. 1996; Bierstaker and Wright 
2001). Bagley (2010) is one of a few studies to consider the effect of multiple accountability 
pressures on auditor performance. She finds that auditors accountable to multiple sources 
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experience higher levels of negative affect, which results in decreased performance on low 
complexity audit tasks. However, due to the manipulation of multiple accountability pressures, 
she is unable to determine what element of the multiple accountability setting is influencing 
auditor affect- the sources of pressure, the extent or pressure, or the level of clarity regarding 
source preferences. She suggests that researchers explore combinations of accountability 
pressure other than the manager, partner, and PCAOB pressure combination employed in her 
study.  
More closely related to the current study is research that investigates how auditors are 
influenced by, and respond to, conflicting viewpoints from the client and audit partner (Gramling 
1999; Bierstaker and Wright 2001).  Gramling (1999) and Bierstaker and Wright (2001) both 
evaluate auditor decision making in an audit planning context when facing conflicting 
preferences from the client and the audit partner. Gramling (1999) investigates how auditors are 
impacted by client pressure (preference to reduce fees vs. receive a high-quality audit), and 
partner pressure (preference for increased quality and skepticism vs. efficiency and profitability).  
She finds that audit managers increase reliance on the use of internal audit when the audit client 
prefers low audit fees to a high-quality audit.  Interestingly, the partner’s preference for either 
quality and skepticism or efficiency and profitability do not have a significant impact on the 
managers’ reliance decisions. She also finds no interactive effect between client and partner 
preference.  Bierstaker and Wright (2001) also investigate how client fee pressure (fees are 
consistent with or less than prior year) and the partner’s preference for efficiency (present or 
absent) impact audit planning decisions regarding budgeted hours and planned testing.  They find 
that auditors budget significantly fewer hours when audit fees have decreased from prior year. 
Evidence suggests that auditors generally reduce the hours of second year staff auditors.  They 
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do not find that the partner’s preference for efficiency impacts budgeting decisions. Related to 
testing decisions, however, both client fee pressure and partner pressure do have a significant 
effect on the number of planned audit tests.  
While these studies investigate auditor decision-making in the presence of conflicting 
preferences between accountability sources, they do not consider the impact that a power 
difference between the conflicting parties has on auditor decision making.  Bierstaker and Wright 
(2001) and Gramling (1999) manipulate client pressure and partner pressure, but they do not 
specifically manipulate a power level difference between these parties. Rather, they focus on 
altering the client and partner preferences. Furthermore, these studies do not induce 
accountability pressure from each source by requiring participants to justify their decision to 
each party. As such, justification timing has also not been evaluated in these studies. It is 
important that research consider how specific characteristics associated with conflicting parties 
and certain environmental factors influence auditor decision making in a multiple accountability 
setting when conflicting preferences are present.  
The power of an accountability source directly relates to the level of control that the party 
has over resources that the accountable party desires (Tetlock 1999). This control over desired 
resources gives parties’ the ability to impose consequences for unsatisfactory performance by the 
accountable party.  An important element of accountability is the notion that consequences are 
incurred, positive or negative, depending on whether one’s justification is satisfactory or not 
(Lerner and Tetlock 1999).  Lerner and Tetlock (1999) recognize multiple sub-manipulations of 
accountability, one of which relates to the expectation that one’s performance will be evaluated 
and consequences will be associated with unsatisfactory performance.   
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In an auditing environment, when accountable to the client contact and superior, the 
resources that they may control include tangible items such as monetary incentives, or audit 
evidence, and intangible items such as future job opportunities, promotions, or an 
accommodating work environment.  As such, power level can vary among conflicting parties and 
may influence an accountable party’s decision-making process. Although theoretically power 
level is either equal or unequal, from a practical perspective the size of the power differential 
between conflicting parties is subjective. 
The level of the client contact with whom an auditor interacts may vary greatly. This 
variance would then result in differing power levels between the client and superior. Smaller 
audit clients often have fewer accounting personnel, so there is less diffusion of accounting 
responsibilities. Management may be performing a variety of accounting functions; thus, 
auditors at all levels may interact directly with client management. Conversely, larger audit 
clients have a number of accounting personnel. Individual workers may be assigned 
responsibilities that focus on one area of the business rather than covering multiple diverse areas. 
In this situation, audit team members may interact with a lower level accountant specifically 
responsible for the area under audit. 
In the current study, the power differential between accountability sources is 
operationalized by describing the client as either the CFO or a staff accountant. The superior in 
this study is the audit manager. The audit manager and a CFO are expected to have a small 
power differential, as both are capable of enforcing more severe consequences with a longer-
term effect. In addition to creating a headache for the auditor on a day-to-day basis by being 
unhelpful and slow to respond to audit requests, the CFO’s position within the organization 
allows him or her to request the auditors’ removal from the engagement or prevent the auditor 
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from obtaining future employment with the company. Similarly, the auditor’s superior may also 
request the auditor’s removal from the audit engagement or give a poor performance review.  
Conversely, when the client contact is a lower level accountant, the manner in which he or she 
can react to unsatisfactory responses from the auditor is limited.  He or she may create 
challenges for the auditor by being unhelpful and slow to respond to the auditor’s requests, but 
likely cannot impose consequences as severe or long lasting as the auditor’s superior. This 
situation, therefore, represents a large power differential between the client and superior. 
Accountability theory suggests that when one party is more powerful than the other, 
individuals tend to align their decisions with the more powerful party (Tetlock 1999).  However, 
when the power difference between parties is small, the decision is less clear-cut as auditors will 
likely feel conflicted about which party to please.  In an attempt to manage reactions from both 
powerful parties, auditors may engage in a more cognitively complex decision-making process. 
In this situation, individuals’ responses will likely differ from the responses formulated when 
auditors are accountable to parties with a large power differential. 
The auditing environment is unique, as significant judgment is involved in determining 
the proper accounting treatment for a particular situation, often with a range of possible 
outcomes.  As such, when there is a large power differential between parties, precise decision 
alignment is unlikely. However, the more powerful party is expected to have greater influence on 
the auditors’ decisions. Thus, the auditors’ decisions will align more closely with the more 
powerful party’s preference. In the client/superior setting where the superior is the more 
powerful party, auditors’ decisions will align more closely with their superior’s preference 
compared to when the auditor is accountable to a client and superior with a small power 
differential.  
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H1a:  Auditors will make decisions more in line with their superior when the power 
differential between the client contact and superior is large, compared to when the 
power differential is small.  
Accountability theory also suggests that auditors accountable to conflicting parties will 
exert more cognitive effort in their decision-making process (Tetlock 1999; Green et al. 2000). 
They “…may become more integratively complex in their consideration of the issues at hand, 
recognizing alternative perspectives on an issue….and identifying trade-offs” (Green et al. 2000, 
1381). This allows the decision maker to reach a defensible conclusion when called upon by 
either party to justify their decision. Prior research supports this notion and finds that auditors 
engage in more effortful decision making when accountable to multiple sources with conflicting 
viewpoints (Jensen 1999; Wood 2009).  Further, as auditors face increased pressure as a result of 
conflicting views from parties with a small power differential, the cognitive effort exerted is 
expected to be greater than if the power differential is large. When the power differential is 
small, the auditor is expected to exert more effort to formulate a unique response. When the 
power differential is large, the auditor is expected to be influenced by the more powerful party 
and is expected to exert less cognitive effort.  
H1b: Auditors will engage in more integrative, complex thinking when the power 
differential between the client contact and superior is small, compared to when 
the power differential is large.   
Construal Level Theory 
Construal level theory is a comprehensive decision-making theory in social psychology, 
which helps provide a better understanding of individual behavior given various levels of 
psychological distance (temporal, spatial, social, or hypotheticality) (Trope and Liberman 2003). 
Trope and Liberman (2010) describe psychological distance as “…a subjective experience that 
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something is close or far away from the self, here, and now” (p. 440). Experimental researchers 
in accounting have begun to apply CLT to predict behavioral outcomes in a variety of areas 
including managerial accounting (McPhee 2014), financial accounting (e.g. Elliott et al. 2014), 
and auditing (e.g. Backof et al. 2016). Specific to the audit context, Backof et al. (2016) 
investigate whether auditor mindset and evidence format influence auditor skepticism regarding 
managements’ assumptions underlying a complex estimate. Drawing on CLT, they propose and 
find that priming a concrete mindset improves auditors’ skepticism by increasing auditors’ 
awareness towards evidence that is inconsistent with management’s assumption. The concrete 
mindset prime also has an additive effect on skepticism levels when utilized in conjunction with 
graphical (as opposed to textual) evidence which also increases auditor skepticism. Furthermore, 
Weisner and Sutton (2015) apply the spatial component of psychological distance and find that 
increased spatial distance in the location of a teleworking specialist results in reduced auditor 
reliance on the specialist. Weisner’s (2015) review of CLT research provides additional 
opportunities for the application of CLT in accounting.   
From an auditing perspective, one type of psychological distance that could impact 
judgments is the temporal component. This is particularly important to consider given that the 
point at which one must justify his or her decisions may vary by accountability source.  For 
example, the audit review process may be delayed (Lambert and Agoglia 2011), thus 
justification to one’s superior may occur weeks after the completion of section work, while 
justification to the client is required during the execution of the required audit tasks. While not 
directly related to the experimental context in this study, Peecher and Solomon (2014) 
acknowledge that PCAOB inspections occur subsequent to the completion of fieldwork and in a 
different study Peecher et al. (2013) propose research questions that consider differences in 
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concurrent and retrospective inspections. Auditors may have to justify their decisions to 
regulators months after the completion of the audit work. CLT provides an explanation of how 
auditors might respond to conflicting accountabilities with varying justification timing. 
CLT suggests that variance in temporal distance affects the way in which individuals 
evaluate or think about certain events. When assessing events in the near future and distant 
future, individuals use low-level and high level construals, respectively. High level construals 
consist of broader, more general thoughts about the event and include features that are essential 
to its occurrence, while low level construals consist of more contextual features or aspects of the 
event that are situation specific (Trope and Liberman 2003). 
Given that individuals assess temporally proximate events using low-level construals, one 
can infer auditors’ actions in situations where justification of a decision is more immediate.  In 
thinking about the requirement to justify their decision to certain evaluative others, auditors will 
consider specific, contextual details associated with the justification process when required to 
justify their decisions in the near future.  They may imagine the person to whom they will justify 
their decision, and how and when the justification process will take place. They will likely 
consider the immediate reaction they will receive for providing an undesirable explanation and 
consider how both they and the evaluative party will feel. For temporally distant events, 
however, the auditor will think about the event in broader terms. They may only consider that 
justification will require them to explain their decisions, but fail to consider specific, contextual 
details of the situation. 
Differences in justification timing are expected to alter decision outcomes. When 
justification timing differs between two conflicting parties, the auditor is expected to focus on 
the preferences of the party to whom they must justify their decision in the near future over the 
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preferences of the party to whom they must justify their decision in the distant future. This is due 
to the more focused and detailed consideration given to the temporally proximate event.   
H2:  When justification timing varies, auditors will make decisions more in line with 
the party to whom they must first justify their response. 
 When auditors must first justify their decision to their superior, the consequences 
perceived by auditors in both the large and small power differential conditions would be similar. 
Thus, in this situation, auditors in each power differential condition will make judgments that 
align more closely with their superior’s preferences. This is due to the auditor’s focus on the 
potential consequences for providing an unsatisfactory response to this more temporally 
proximate party. However, when they must first justify their decision to the client, the power 
differential between parties has an effect. When the power difference between the client (staff 
accountant) and superior is large, auditors are expected to perceive the consequences associated 
with an unfavorable response to be less severe than auditors who are accountable to the client 
(CFO) and superior with a small power difference. Given this difference in perceived 
consequences, auditors are expected to most closely align their decisions with the client 
preferences when they must first justify their decision to the client and there is a small power 
differential between the client and the superior. 
H3: Justification timing will moderate the effect of power level such that auditors will 
make decisions more in line with the client when there is a low power differential 
between the client contact and the superior, and the auditor must justify their 
decision to the client first. 
III. Experimental Method and Design 
Participants 
 Auditor participants were obtained through Qualtrics Panel, which used a “double opt-in 
process” when recruiting panel members to help guarantee high-quality participants. Panel 
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members were screened prior to participation to ensure they had the appropriate credentials. 
Only those recruits who were currently employed as an external auditor and worked at a firm 
with greater than 1,000 people were qualified to participate. Useable responses were obtained 
from 80 auditors. 30 Table 6 presents demographic information for the participants. 
Approximately 81% of participants had 1-10 years of auditing experience. The majority of 
participants had only external audit experience (72.5%), but some had experience in both 
external and internal audit (27.5%). Participants were also primarily current staff and senior 
auditors (68.8%). Fifty-five percent of all participants were female and 45% were male. 
Table 6: Demographic Profile of Participants 
 n (%) 
  
Gender:  
Female 44 (55.0) 
Male 36 (45.0) 
  
Age:  
18-20 1 (1.2) 
21-25 8 (10.0) 
26-30 22 (27.5) 
31-35 18 (22.5) 
36-40 12 (15.0) 
40+ 19 (23.8) 
  
Years of Auditing Experience:  
1-5 years 34 (42.5) 
6-10 years 31 (38.8) 
11-15 years 9 (11.2) 
16+ years 6 (7.5) 
  
Type of Auditing Experience:  
External Audit 58 (72.5) 
Internal Audit and External 
Audit 
22 (27.5) 
                                                 
30 Upon collection, qualitative data associated with the DV was evaluated to ensure quality responses and sufficient 
effort. Those responses were reviewed for the following characteristics- gibberish, uninterpretable incomplete 
sentences, responses that do not relate to the question or materials provided, and responses that indicate a lack of 
interest in the study.  Data with these characteristics were excluded due to poor quality and additional data were 
obtained by Qualtrics Panel. Three rounds of data collection were executed to obtain 105 responses, 80 of which 
were deemed usable. In the overall sample of 105 participants, 25 participants were excluded for the following 
reasons: 13 were removed due to an improper response to an open-ended question regarding the DV, 10 were 
removed due to an unreasonable number of auditors being on an average. 
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 n (%) 
  
Level within the Firm  
Staff 18 (22.5) 
Senior 37 (46.3) 
Manager/Sr. Manager 20 (25) 
Partner 5 (6.3) 
  
Experimental Task 
 This experiment is a 2 x 2 between-participants experimental design that manipulates 
power differential (small vs. large) between parties with conflicting viewpoints and justification 
timing (superior first vs. client first).  The participants are told that that their client contact is 
either the staff accountant or the CFO, which represents the manipulation of the large and small 
power differential, respectively.  They are then told they must immediately explain their decision 
to either their superior or the client contact. They are also told that they will be asked to explain 
their decision to the remaining party at a later point in time. 
 Participants receive a hypothetical case about the calculation for the allowance for 
uncollectible accounts.31  They assume the role of the audit senior on the engagement for CWN 
where they are responsible for the audit of the allowance for doubtful accounts.  Due to a change 
in marketing strategy at CWN, the client has elected to change the reserve percentages associated 
with this account. The new marketing strategy has resulted in the addition of four major 
customers to CWN’s customer base. After the change in marketing strategy, multiple smaller 
customers from prior years make up a significantly smaller portion of CWN’s accounts 
receivable than they have in the past. As a result, the client has changed the way that the reserve 
percentages are calculated. They have opted to use only current year information to calculate the 
                                                 
31 Task was adapted from Johnstone and Muztako (2002). 
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uncollectibilty of each aging bucket resulting in an allowance account balance of $400,000. In 
prior years, however, they have used a five-year historical average for this calculation.  
Participants are told that their superior, the audit manager on the engagement, prefers a 
more conservative approach and favors the methodology used in the prior year. The 
methodology used in prior years would yield a balance of $600,000 in the allowance account. 
The new methodology results in a balance that is $200,000 less than it would be if the balance 
were calculated using the methodology the client has employed in prior years. This scenario is 
designed to elicit feelings of conflict between the client and the superior. Information concerning 
the four new customers and their credit histories, as well as the client’s reserve calculation and 
the prior year audit workpaper are made available to participants. They are then asked to make a 
decision regarding the appropriate balance for the allowance for doubtful accounts and to 
provide a justification for that decision.  
Independent Variables 
 Power differential between the superior and client contact is manipulated by altering the 
client’s position within their organization. As discussed previously, the ability to control 
resources that a decision maker values represents an individual’s power level. The control of 
these resources allows an individual to impose consequences upon a decision maker for 
unsatisfactory performance.  While imposing actual consequences upon participants is not 
possible, the participants are told what consequences they may incur for disagreeing with their 
client or superior. The wording utilized in the case materials to describe the consequences 
associated with unsatisfactory responses to the various parties is provided in Appendix A. 
A large power differential is operationalized by describing the client contact as a staff 
accountant and the superior as an audit manager. The scenario describes potential consequences 
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for not agreeing with each of the respective parties. The staff accountant is unlikely to be able to 
impose consequences as severe as the auditor’s superior, thus representing a large power 
differential between the two parties.  The accountant may create challenges for the auditor by 
being unhelpful and slow to respond to the auditors’ requests.  However, they likely cannot 
impose consequences as severe or long lasting as the auditor’s superior, such as providing a poor 
performance review or requesting the auditor’s removal from the audit engagement.   
A small power differential, on the other hand, is operationalized by describing the client 
contact as the CFO; the superior is the audit manager in this condition as well. The CFO also has 
the ability to potentially impose severe consequences with a longer-term effect, similar to those 
of the audit superior.  The CFO’s position within their organization will likely allow him or her 
to request the auditors’ removal from the engagement and prevent the auditor from being 
considered for future job opportunities with the company. The ability to impose more severe, 
potentially long-term consequences represents the small power difference between the audit 
superior and the CFO.  
Justification timing is manipulated as superior first or client first. Participants are told 
they must immediately provide an explanation to the audit manager [staff accountant/CFO] for 
their decision regarding the appropriate balance for the allowance for doubtful accounts. They 
are then told that they will also be asked to provide an explanation for their decision to the staff 
accountant/CFO [audit manager] at a later point in time. Although participants did not 
experience an actual, significant time delay, prior psychology research on construal level theory 
has successfully manipulated temporal distance by describing a time delay (Liberman and Trope 
1998; Trope and Liberman 2000). As such, the manipulation utilized in this study is expected to 
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successfully manipulate temporal distance such that participants consider the immediate event 
using low level construals and the distant event using high level construals. 
To operationalize accountability in the experimental setting, participants were told that 
their work will be reviewed and they will be asked to immediately provide an explanation for 
their decision to one of the two parties to whom they are accountable. This party varies 
depending on experimental condition. They were also told they will be required to provide an 
explanation to the remaining party at a later point in time. Participants were required to “sign 
off” on the balance they deem to be appropriate, which consisted of them agreeing to a statement 
acknowledging that they feel the balance they selected is appropriate and that they are signing 
off on their work. 
Attention and Manipulation Check Questions 
Prior to the dependent variable, participants were asked what role they were to assume in 
the case provided. They were not allowed to continue with the survey until they provided the 
correct response. This was done to ensure participants assumed the proper role when responding 
to the dependent variable. This question is an attention check and is not deemed to be a 
manipulation check as participants across all conditions assumed the role of audit senior. 
Immediately following the screen with the dependent variable, the first manipulation 
check question asked participants to indicate the position of their client contact in the case 
materials provided. Those participants who responded incorrectly to this question were not 
allowed to continue with the survey, as it suggests insufficient attention was paid to the case 
materials.  
To determine if the participants perceived a power difference between the client contact 
and the superior, they were asked two questions related to perceived consequences. The first 
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question asked about the severity of consequences associated with making a decision that does 
not align with the client contact and the second asked about the severity of consequences 
associated with making a decision that does not align with the audit manager. Theoretically, 
power difference represents the variability in consequences that may occur between two 
accountability sources. In the small power differential condition, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
indicates there was no significant difference in the perceived consequences for disagreeing with 
the CFO (mean = 3.23) and the audit manager (mean = 3.23) (p = 0.39, one-tailed). However, 
participants in the large power differential condition did perceive the consequences for 
disagreeing with the audit manager (mean = 3.25) to be significantly more severe than the 
consequences for disagreeing with the staff accountant (mean = 2.88) (p = 0.02, one-tailed). 
These results indicate that the variation in the client contact’s position successfully manipulated 
the perceived power level difference between the accountability sources, such that there was a 
large and small power difference in the staff accountant and CFO conditions, respectively.  
Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable is the extent to which the participant’s response aligns 
with the superior’s preference.  The measure used to assess decision alignment (H1a, H2 and H3) 
is the dollar difference between the client’s preferred balance in the allowance for doubtful 
accounts and the participant’s judgment regarding the appropriate balance. The client prefers a 
balance of $400,000, and the superior prefers a balance of $600,000; thus, the amount can range 
from $0 to $200,000. The larger the difference, the greater the alignment between the 
participant’s assessment and the superior’s preference. 
The extent of integratively complex thinking employed by each participant (H1b) is 
measured based on the total number of factors that the participant considered in making their 
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decision.  These factors consist of items related to the decision itself as well as to the external 
decision making environment. More factors identified by the auditors suggest a greater 
consideration of “alternative perspectives on an issue” as well as trade-offs between various 
decision outcomes (Green et al. 2000, 1381). Those participants employing more integrative 
complex thinking should identify more factors as applicable to their decision-making process.  
IV. Results 
Decision Alignment 
 Table 7, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for decision alignment for each 
experimental condition.  The higher the value, the greater the alignment of the participant’s 
decision and the superior’s preference. The values displayed are in thousands of dollars. A 
review of the means associated with each power differential condition shows that auditors 
accountable to the staff accountant made decisions that were $13,500 closer to their superior’s 
preference (mean = 114.35) than did auditors accountable to the CFO (mean = 100.05). The 
mean difference between the small power difference and large power difference indicates that 
auditors tend to more closely align their decisions with the preferences of their superior when 
there is a large power differential between the client and their superior. Justification timing also 
appears to impact auditors’ decisions. However, a comparison of group means suggests that 
auditors align their decisions more closely to the preferences of their superior when they must 
justify their decision to the client first (mean = 118.56) compared to when they must justify their 
decision to their superior first (mean = 95.26). A graphical depiction of the results is provided in 
Figure 5.  
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of H1a, H2, and H3. 
 
Decision Alignment (in 000’s) * 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Decision Alignment (higher value equals greater 
alignment with superior)   Mean [Standard Deviation] 
 
 Justification Timing  
Power Differential  Client First  Superior First   
       
Small Power Differential-
CFO Client Contact  114.45  85.65 100.05  
  [50.28]  [38.63] [46.60]  
  n=20  n=20 n=40  
       
Large Power Differential- 
Staff Accountant Client 
Contact  122.48  105.37 114.35  
  [50.45]  [36.90] [44.81]  
  n=21  n=19 n=40  
       
  118.56  95.26   
  [49.90]  [38.61]   
  n=41  n=39   
      
Panel B: ANCOVA Results 
 
Source of Variation  df  MSE  F-statistic  p-value  
          
Power Difference   1  5709.42  2.945  0.090  
Justification Timing   1  9665.42  4.986  0.029  
Power Diff X Justification Timing  1  592.95  .306  0.582  
Prior AR Audit Experience  1  6410.04  3.307  0.073  
Error  75        
          
Panel C: Planned Comparison Tests a  
          
      
 
T-statistic 
 
p-value b  
       
H1a: Small Power Differential<Large Power 
Differential (+1,+1,-1,-1) 
 -1.745 0.043 
 
H2: Client First < Superior First (+1,+1,-1,-1)   2.274 0.985  
H3: Small Power Differential/Client First < Small 
Power Differential/Superior First, Large Power 
Differential/Client First, Large Power 
Differential/Superior First (-3,+1,+1,+1) 
 -.592 0.278 
 
 
a 
Includes covariate of prior AR experience  
b 
Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent  
* Decision alignment is the dollar difference between the client’s preferred balance in the allowance for doubtful accounts and 
the participant’s judgment regarding the appropriate balance. The amount can range from $0 to $200,000. The larger the 
difference, the greater the alignment between the participant’s assessment and the superior’s preference.  
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Figure 5: Graphical Depiction of Results- Decision Alignment 
 H1a predicts that an auditor’s decision will align more closely with the preference of 
their superior when there is a large power differential between the client and superior compared 
to when there is a small power differential between the client and the superior.  A 2 x 2 
ANCOVA is conducted with power difference and justification timing as the independent 
variables and prior experience with accounts receivable as the control variable. 32 The results are 
provided in Table 7, Panel B. The results suggest there is a marginally significant main effect for 
power difference (F = 2.945, p = 0.090, two-tailed).  Due to the directional nature of the 
hypothesis, a planned comparison of the means between the large power differential condition 
and small power differential condition was conducted. The small power differential condition is 
                                                 
32 Participants were asked to respond to demographic questions regarding age, gender, and work experience. 
Questions about work experience include information regarding years of prior work experience in accounting and 
auditing, type of prior work experience, prior experience auditing accounts receivable, firm type, current level 
within their firm, and primary industry. All demographic variables were regressed on the primary dependent variable 
of decision alignment and evaluated for significance. Of those variables, only two, gender and prior experience with 
accounts receivable, were significant at p < .10 However, when including these variables in the ANCOVA model, 
gender was insignificant at p = 0.174. As such, the ANCOVA model included only prior AR experience as a 
covariate. The conclusions reached based on the statistical analysis do not differ whether you include or exclude 
gender as a covariate in the ANCOVA model. 
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assigned a contrast weight of +1, and the large power differential is assigned a contrast weight of 
-1. Table 7, Panel C shows that the planned comparison is significant (t= -1.745, p = 0.043, one-
tailed). Furthermore, a review of the group means also indicates the significant results are in the 
expected direction. Auditors’ decisions more closely align with the preferences of the auditor’s 
superior when there is large power differential between the client and superior, thus H1a is 
supported.   
 H2 predicts that when auditors justify their decisions to two conflicting parties, the 
decision will more closely align with the party to whom they must first provide their 
justification. As shown in Table 7, Panel B, the results indicate a significant main effect for 
justification timing (F = 4.986; p = 0.029, two-tailed). H2 is tested using a planned comparison, 
with the client first condition assigned a contrast weight of +1, and the superior first condition 
assigned a contrast weight of -1. The results shown in Table 7, Panel C suggest that the main 
effect of justification timing is not significant in the predicted direction (t=2.274, p = 0.985, one-
tailed). Rather, the group means indicate that auditors align their decisions with the preference of 
the party to whom they must justify their decision last rather than first. As such, H2 is not 
supported.  
 Finally, H3 predicts an interactive effect between power level and justification timing 
such that justification timing moderates the effect of power differential. More specifically, 
decisions should align most closely with the client when the power differential between the client 
and superior is small, and the auditor must first justify his or her decision to the client. A planned 
comparison was conducted to identify whether participants in the small power differential/client 
first condition made decisions that are significantly different than participants in all other 
conditions. The small power differential/client first condition was assigned a contrast weight of -
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3, while all other conditions were assigned contrast weights of +1. Table 7, Panel C presents the 
results of the planned contrast and suggests no significant difference between the small power 
differential/client first condition and all other conditions (t = -.592; p = 0.278, one-tailed). As 
such, H3 is not supported.  
Integrative Complexity 
H1b evaluates the extent of integratively complex thinking employed in the auditor’s 
decision-making process. It predicts that auditors accountable to conflicting parties with a small 
power differential will engage in a more integrative complexity decision-making process than 
those accountable to conflicting parties with a large power differential.  The dependent variable 
of interest is the number of factors each participant identified as being part of their decision-
making process. Table 8 provides a description of each factor and the number of participants 
who identified that factor as being important in their decision-making process. The 
reasonableness of the client’s new method for calculating the allowance was the most frequently 
selected factor. 
Table 8: Number of Factors Identified by Factor Type 
 
Reasonablenes
s of Client’s 
New Method 
Ability to 
Explain 
the 
Decision 
to Others 
Manager’s 
Happiness 
with the 
Decision 
Client’s 
Happiness 
with the 
Decision 
Background 
and 
Experience 
of the Client 
Customer 
Credit 
Histories 
Background 
and 
Experience 
of the 
Manager 
Client 
Contact’s 
Rank 
within the 
Company 
        
53 51 42 40 40 39 26 15 
        
        
*Each participant could select 1-9 factors that they considered in their allowance decision. The ninth category 
was “other” and allowed for text entry to capture any additional items that the participants may have considered 
in their decision-making processes. No participants selected this category, thus it has been excluded from the 
table. 
        
 
Table 9, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for this measure. A review of the 
means suggests that participants in the small power differential condition identified more factors 
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as being related to their allowance decision (mean = 4.20) than participants in the large power 
differential condition (mean = 3.45). Figure 6 provides a graphical depiction of the results related 
to integrative complexity. 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of H1b 
 
Extent of Integrative Complexity 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics- Extent of Integrative Complexity (Number of Factors 
Identified)   Mean [Standard Deviation] 
 
 Justification Timing  
Power Differential  Client First  Manager First   
       
Small Power Differential-
CFO Client Contact  3.95  4.45 4.20  
  [2.417]  [2.089] [2.244]  
  n=20  n=20 n=40  
       
Large Power Differential- 
Staff Accountant Client 
Contact  3.67  3.21 3.45  
  [1.826]  [1.653] [1.739]  
  n=21  n=19 n=40  
       
  3.80  3.85   
  [2.112]  [1.967]   
  n=41  n=39   
       
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
 
Source of Variation  df  MSE  F-statistic  p-value  
          
Power Difference   1  11.580  2.842  0.096  
Justification Timing   1  .010  .002  0.961  
Power Diff X Justification Timing  1  4.565  1.120  0.293  
Error  76        
          
Panel C: Planned Comparison Test 
          
    T-statistic  p-value a  
H1b: Small Power Differential > Large Power 
Differential (+1,+1,-1,-1) 1.686  0.048  
          
 
a 
Reported p-value is the one-tailed equivalent 
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Figure 6: Graphical Depiction of Results- Integrative Complexity 
To test H1b, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with the number of factors the participant 
identified as being part of their decision-making process representing the dependent variable, and 
power differential and justification timing as the independent variables.33 Table 9, Panel B 
presents the main effect for power differential (F= 2.842, p = 0.096, two-tailed).  The planned 
comparison evaluating whether participants in the small power differential condition identified 
more factors as being relevant to their decision than participants in the large power differential 
condition is presented in Table 9, Panel C. The results of the planned comparison suggest that 
participants in the small power differential condition identified significantly more factors than 
those in the large power differential condition (t=1.686, p = 0.048, one-tailed34), thus, H1b is 
supported for this measure.  
                                                 
33 Participants were asked to respond to demographic questions regarding age, gender, and work experience. 
Questions about work experience include information regarding years of prior work experience in accounting and 
auditing, type of prior work experience, prior experience auditing accounts receivable, firm type, current level 
within their firm, and primary industry. All demographic variables were regressed on the dependent variables (total 
factors identified) and evaluated for significance. Of those variables, none were significant at p < .10, thus no 
covariates were included in the analysis.  
34 The Levene’s test is not significant, thus the assumption of homogeneity of variance is satisfied. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 This results from this study provide evidence that the power level difference between two 
conflicting parties does influence auditors’ decisions. Consistent with accountability theory, 
when there is a large power differential between two conflicting parties, auditors’ decisions align 
more closely with the preferences of the more powerful party. The results also suggest that the 
difference in these decisions is due to the auditors employing a more integratively complex 
decision-making process when accountable to conflicting parties with a small power difference.  
However, justification timing also appears to influence auditor decision making, but not in a 
manner consistent with the predictions of CLT. Participants align their decisions with the 
preferences of the temporally distant party, rather than the temporally proximate party.  
 The unexpected findings regarding justification timing may be attributable to a couple of 
factors centered around the possibility that the participants employed a negotiation mindset when 
making their decision. They may have made a decision that aligns more with the party to whom 
they must justify their decision last, thus providing some flexibility to compromise and 
somewhat accommodate the first party’s preference when meeting with them. Thereby, pleasing 
the first party through compromise, yet still aligning their decision, to a greater degree, with the 
party to whom they must last justify their decision, ultimately pleasing both parties to some 
extent. Participants may have also perceived a greater social connection with the audit manager.  
As such, they side with their manager when they must justify their decision to the manager last. 
In this instance, they may feel there is less opportunity to change their decision because they 
have already talked with the client, and ultimately, they want to please their manager due the 
strong social connection. However, when they justify their decision to the manager first, they 
side with the client as they may perceive that the manager would want to accommodate the 
client’s position to some extent. Furthermore, they may feel they that if the manager is adamant 
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against taking the client’s position, they can adjust their position if necessary. They would then 
contact the client with their decision, knowing they have the support of their manager.  Although 
the experimental design did not provide opportunity for negotiation and an ability to alter the 
decision made throughout the justification process, the participants may have approached the 
task with their knowledge of the audit environment where this would likely be possible. 
The findings of this study contribute to auditing research on accountability by identifying 
another way in which auditors’ decisions are influenced by accountability pressure. Historically, 
research in this area has focused on accountability to a single source. This study is one of the 
first to investigate how certain characteristics within a multiple accountability setting influence 
auditor decision making. This is particularly important give the multiple accountability pressures 
that auditors face in practice. Understanding the impact of a power differential between 
conflicting accountability sources allows audit firms to implement mechanism that may be able 
to mitigate these effects. 
As with any study, there are limitations that must be recognized. The use of practicing 
auditors allowed the participants to better internalize the case materials and provided an 
understanding of the audit environment that audit students likely would not have. However, the 
electronic distribution of this experiment to auditors in remote locations provides less control 
than if the study were conducted in a laboratory setting.  Due to this electronic distribution, the 
temporal manipulation was simulated by using specific wording in the case provided. It is 
possible, however, that a laboratory setting could produce results consistent with CLT when a 
significant timing delay between justifications to multiple accountability sources can be 
implemented. Furthermore, audit participants may have applied their understanding of the 
environment to the audit experiment, thus making assumptions that extend beyond the 
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experimental manipulations and thereby influencing their decisions in a manner inconsistent with 
theory. 
The presence of multiple accountability pressures alone does not influence auditor 
decision making in a standard, predictable manner. Furthermore, the need to concurrently 
manage multiple accountability pressures is somewhat unique to the audit environment and 
differentiates the audit setting from a number of other work environments.  Future research 
should investigate additional environmental factors or accountability source characteristics that 
influence decision making in a multiple accountability setting.  Research should also consider 
contexts outside of the client/superior relationship and investigate auditor decision making when 
accountable to multiple other parties from regulators to the audit committee and various other 
stakeholders. Related to this study, researchers may also want to explore why the predictions 
associated with CLT do not apply in the audit setting. This could provide a better understanding 
of those factors that influence auditor decision making and provide more insight into those 
situations where CLT may not be applicable.    
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation contains three studies examining accountability in auditing. Phillip 
Tetlock’s social contingency model serves as the common underlying theory utilized in each 
study (Tetlock 1992, Tetlock and Lerner 1999, Tetlock 1999). This social psychological theory 
focuses on conceptualizing individuals’ responses to accountability pressure. The first study 
develops an organizing framework for the experimental auditing literature on accountability and 
provides a discussion of the research based on this framework. It also synthesizes this literature 
and compares the overall findings to the social contingency model, offering a discussion of 
where these findings are consistent with the social contingency model and those instances where 
the findings deviate from theory. Studies two and three, which utilize Tetlock’s social 
contingency model as theoretical motivation, experimentally investigate individual auditors’ 
decision making under accountability pressure. In addition to utilizing Tetlock’s theory, the 
second study uses the strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al. 1998) to examine whether 
accountability can mitigate the effect that ego depletion has on auditor performance. The third 
study investigates the influence of multiple accountability pressures on auditor decision making, 
also utilizing the social contingency model, as well as construal level theory (Liberman and 
Trope 1998) as theoretical motivation.  While these studies all have a common theme of 
accountability, they contribute to our understanding of accountability in three unique ways.  
 Study one reviews the experimental audit literature on accountability and provides 
opportunities for future research. While much of the research on accountability focuses on the 
effect that accountability pressure from a single source has on auditor decision making, far less 
investigates the effects of multiple accountability pressures. Furthermore, limited research 
considers the way in which auditors respond to process and outcome accountability, thus 
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providing another fruitful area of research. Research focuses heavily on the impact that 
accountability has on auditor judgment and decision making. Surprisingly, very little research 
considers how environmental factors influence perceptions of accountability. To fully understand 
how accountability will influence auditors in practice, it is important to understand those factors 
that influence feelings of accountability within the audit context. 
 Overall, the literature review also suggests that the findings of the auditing research on 
accountability are generally consistent with the social contingency model. However, there are 
some instances where research appears to deviate from this model. A closer look suggests that 
the results are not necessarily inconsistent with the model, but rather, the studies encompass 
factors not captured in the model. Specifically, knowledge of an accountability source’s 
preferences does not always hinder auditor effort. When these preferences are for an effective 
audit process, auditor effort and testing strategies can be improved. 
 Study two experimentally investigates the moderating effect of accountability. It 
examines whether accountability mitigates the performance declines auditor’s experience when 
suffering from ego depletion. While prior research shows depletion negatively impacts auditor 
performance (Bhaskar et al. 2016), the results of this study indicate that depletion may improve 
auditor performance in certain circumstances. Additionally, the findings suggest that the 
performance of auditors who are accountable for their work does not differ significantly based on 
the presence or absence of ego depletion.  
 Study three examines how multiple accountability pressures influence auditors’ 
decisions. It considers how a power level difference between two accountability sources, as well 
as a variance in justification timing, impact auditors’ decisions.  Specifically, this study 
operationalizes multiple accountability pressures as conflicting preferences from the audit client 
128 
and audit manager regarding the appropriate balance in allowance for doubtful accounts. These 
findings indicate that auditors are influenced by a power level difference between conflicting 
parties, and that justification timing also has an effect on auditors’ decisions. 
 Taken together, studies two and three further our understanding of how individual 
auditors respond to accountability pressure(s). These studies also contribute to two other streams 
of research outside of accountability, one looking at the effects of ego depletion on auditor 
performance (study two), and the other focusing on the application of construal level theory in 
auditing (study three). Study two provides evidence that accountability is successful at 
improving auditor performance. However, ego depletion is also found to improve performance, 
but the effect of depletion and accountability is not additive. As such, accountability can be seen 
as a substitute for depletion as a means of improving auditor performance. Study three highlights 
the importance of considering the way in which certain characteristics associated with multiple 
accountability relationships influence decision making. Investigating the impact of multiple 
accountability pressures requires the manipulation of accountability source attributes or 
environmental characteristics to fully understand the extent to which auditors are influenced by 
multiple parties. 
 The results of this dissertation should be of interest to accounting firms due to the 
practical implications of the findings. Prior research on accountability in auditing suggests that 
firms should focus on communicating preferences for conducting the audit in an effective 
manner, with an emphasis on skepticism and objectivity. This will help to increase audit effort 
and result in a less biased decision making process. Firms should also be interested in the 
performance gains that depleted auditors may experience in certain circumstances, likely by 
priming auditors’ system one to engage in more effortful cognitive processing. Accountability 
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also improves auditor performance to a similar degree in instances where auditors are not 
depleted. Lastly, firms should consider identifying mechanisms that may mitigate the 
unwelcomed effects that a power differential and justification timing have on auditor decision 
making, or consider restructuring certain elements of the accountability relationships in a manner 
that limits these effects. Overall, this dissertation offers useful information to firms and 
regulators, which can help them to maximize auditor objectivity in the decision-making process 
when accountability pressure is present, thereby improving overall audit quality. 
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Potential consequences for disagreeing with the audit manager’s preference: 
“You recognize that taking a position counter to your Manager’s preference may 
(also) result in consequences, such as a request for your removal from the 
engagement team or unfavorable scheduling on other client engagements.” 
Potential consequences for disagreeing with the CFO’s preference: 
“You recognize that taking a position counter to the CFO’s preference may (also) 
result in consequences, such as a request for your removal form the engagement 
team or lost job opportunities at CWN in the future.” 
Potential consequences for disagreeing with the staff accountant’s preference: 
“You recognize that taking a position counter to the staff accountant’s preference 
may (also) result in consequences, such as delayed responses to audit requests and 
an unfriendly demeanor towards the audit team.” 
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Study 2- Experimental Materials- Initial Experiment 
All- Consent 
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All- Agreement to Participate 
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Depleted Group– E-Counting Task Part 1 
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Depleted Group– E-Counting Task Part 2 
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Non- Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Non-Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Non-Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)
 
  
142 
Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable) 
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Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable) 
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Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)
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Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable) 
 
 
  
149 
Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)
 
150 
All- Overall Risk Assessment 
 
 
  
151 
All- Instructions to Proceed 
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All- Stroop Task Instructions 
 
 
After this screen, participants were redirected to another website to complete the Stroop 
Task. Upon completion of the Stroop Task, they completed the manipulation check 
questions, post experimental questions, and demographic questions shown on the next 
several pages.  
  
153 
All- Manipulation Check Questions 
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All- BMIS Mood Scale (Mayer and Gaschke 1988) 
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All- Trait Self Control (Tangney et al. 2004)
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All- Perception of Depletion (Clarkson et al. 2010) 
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All- Trait Skepticism (Hurtt 2010) 
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159 
All- Post Experimental Question  
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All- Demographic Questions 
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All- End of Survey Screen 
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Study 2- Experimental Materials- Follow Up Experiment 
All- Consent 
 
 
  
164 
All- Agreement to Participate 
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Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 1 
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Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 2 
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Non-Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 1 
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Non-Depleted Group- E-Counting Task Part 2 
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Non-Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Non-Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Non-Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Non-Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)
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Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable) 
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Non Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable) 
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Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Accountable- Task Instructions 
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Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)
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Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable) 
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Accountable- Risk Assessment Exercise (Dependent Variable)
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All- Overall Risk Assessment 
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All- End of Risk Assessment Exercise 
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All- State Mood (PANAS Scale- Watson et al. 1988)
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All- Manipulation Check Question 
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All- Perception of Depletion (Clarkson et al. 2010) and level of motivation 
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All- Trait Self Control (Tangney et al. 2004) 
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All- Trait Skepticism (Hurtt 2010)
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All Demographic Questions 
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All- Trait Mood (PANAS Scale- Watson et al. 1988) 
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All- End of Survey Screen 
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Study 3- Experimental Materials  
All- Screening Questions 
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All- Consent 
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CFO Client Contact 
Version A- CFO/Client First 
Version B- CFO/Superior First 
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CFO – Background Reading (Versions A&B) 
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CFO/Client First- Task Description (Version A) 
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CFO/Client First- Dependent Variable (Version A) 
 
 
199 
 
 
 
  
200 
CFO/Superior First- Task Description (Version B) 
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CFO/Superior First- Dependent Variable (Version B) 
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All- Manipulation Check 
 
 
  
204 
CFO – Post Experimental Questions Part 1 (Versions A & B) 
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CFO- Post Experimental Questions Part 2 (Versions A&B) 
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All- Skepticism Scale 
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CFO/Client First- Second Explanation (Versions A) 
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CFO/Superior First- Second Explanation (Version B) 
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Staff Accountant Client Contact 
Version C- Staff Accountant/Client First 
Version D- Staff Accountant/Superior First 
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Staff Accountant- Background Reading (Versions C&D) 
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Staff Accountant/Client First- Task Description (Version C) 
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Staff Accountant/Client First- Dependent Variable (Version C) 
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Staff Accountant/Superior First – Task Description (Version D) 
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Staff Accountant/Superior First – Dependent Variable (Version D) 
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All- Manipulation Check 
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Staff Accountant- Post Experimental Questions part 1 (Versions C&D) 
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Staff Accountant- Post Experimental Questions Part 2 (Versions C&D) 
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All- Skepticism Scale
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Staff Accountant/Client First- Second Explanation (Versions C) 
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Staff Accountant/Superior First- Second Explanation (Version D) 
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All – Demographic Questions 
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Audit Evidence  
Links were provided on the dependent variable screen 
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Client’s Allowance Calculation: 
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Prior Year Audit Workpaper: 
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Credit Reports  
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